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Historically, there have been serious contestations (sometimes accompanied by 
violence) over right to live and work in the city of Durban. The history of Durban can be 
divided into three distinct phases spanning some hundred and seventy three years.  It 
was first colonised by the British in 1844 who annexed it as a colony from the 
indigenous Zulu population.   Durban served as a point of contact for extensive 
hinterland trade through its port. With the cultivation of sugar cane in the 1860s 
onwards it became an important point of export trade and import of manufactured 
products from the rest of the British empire. In looking at the early history of Durban as 
a British colony it would be a major omission if mention was not made of it being the 
centre for the trading of Indentured Indians, a contractual form of slavery to work the 
sugar plantations of the colony. During the period of colonialism violent clashes took 
place with the indigenous population as the British penetrated the hinterland.  
 
In 1948, Durban took a new spatial form when the Afrikaner National party ascended to 
power.  The Nationalist Party pursued strict segregationist policies which came to be 
known as apartheid. It tried to ensure that Blacks (Africans, Indians and Coloureds) 
who came to co-exist during the colonial times were confined to segregated 
neighbourhoods and the core city was predominantly preserved for white ownership 
and occupation. In pursuing apartheid policies, hundreds of thousands of Blacks were 
victims of forced removals and were relocated to dormitory type townships on the 
fringes of the city. Durban’s socio-spatial configuration was shaped and styled by four 
distinct racial boundaries which has persisted into the post-apartheid era. 
 
Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, policy makers, researchers and urban planners 
were caught in the political wave to desegregate urban spaces so that it is inclusive, 
sustainable and equitable. The guiding principle for such change was contained in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was the ANC’s political 
mandate for the transformation of the country. This political mandate for social change 
was dealt a major blow when the Government of National Unity in 1996 adopted the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy.  GEAR was founded on a neo-
liberal macro-economic policy that saw the ascendancy of the market and the retreat of 
the state.   Hence, in most South African cities, including Durban, the social, welfare 
and basic needs of the poor and disadvantaged were sacrificed, and anticipated trickle-
down benefits evaporated. This has resulted in violent contestations between 
communities and local authorities over access to resources and basic needs. 
 
These themes form the focus of this paper, and there is a specific emphasis on the 
socio-spatial transformations which have taken place in Durban in the apartheid and 
post-apartheid eras, and the associated forms of urban violence. There have been 
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The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the different forms of socio-
spatial transformations which have taken place in Durban over the past twenty years, 
and especially in terms of how this has impacted on the different forms of urban 
violence. Historically, there have been serious contestations (sometimes accompanied 
by violence) over right to live and work in the city of Durban. This was especially so in 
the apartheid era, when black male workers were considered to be temporary 
sojourners in white urban spaces, heralded by the Urban Areas Act (1923)1 and the 
male migrant labour system (Rich, 1978). This was followed by the forced 
displacement and relocation of settled and established black communities to the distant 
periphery in terms of the Group Areas Act (1950)2 Given the city’s racial and ethnic 
mix, there was incipient tensions between the indigenous Zulus and Indians 
(descendants of indentured labour) which occasionally flared up into open violence and 
conflict.  
 
The post-apartheid era heralded the phase of reconstruction, development and 
planning, a strategy to address the socio-spatial injustice and inequalities associated 
with impress of apartheid. These great expectations were rapidly dashed with the 
adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution3 macro-economic strategy in 
1996, and the capitulation of the state-market nexus to the neoliberal agenda. Hence, 
in most South African cities, including Durban, the social, welfare and basic needs of 
the poor and disadvantaged were sacrificed, and anticipated trickle-down benefits 
evaporated.  
 
The focus on Durban turned to megaprojects such as the International Convention 
Centre, the uShaka Marine Park, sport stadiums, malls, and new port developments. In 
terms of the new port developments, it is envisaged that at least 80 000 people would 
be forcefully displaced. In preparing to host mega-events like FIFA 2010, attempts were 
made to clean up the inner city of Durban, and also to destroy a century-old market 
which could adversely affect the livelihoods of up to 25 000 people. These various 
themes form the focus of this city profile but some reflection on the historical 




The English had settled in Durban since 1824 with the establishment of a trading post, 
in a region which belonged to the Zulu nation.  Within the next three decades Durban 
developed into a harbour town, which encouraged the expansion of secondary and 
tertiary economic activities (Figure 1).  In 1854 Durban became a municipality with an 
                     
1 This Act made each local authority responsible for blacks in their respective areas. It regulated influx 
of blacks in urban areas and all surplus and redundant blacks were moved to designated African 
reserves. 
2 The Group Areas act was enacted under the apartheid government which assigned racial groups to 
different residential and business sections in urban areas. 
3 Commonly known by the acronym GEAR, it was designed to stimulate faster economic growth to 
provide resources to meet social needs. It encompassed most objectives of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) but aimed at reducing fiscal deficits, inflation rates, maintaining 
exchange rate stability, decreasing barriers to trade and liberalizing capital flows – basically a 
neoliberal strategy. 
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elected town council.  Whites were the only franchised group in the city.4  Initially, the 
city was dominated by mercantile interests within the predominantly White community.  
Durban experienced rapid economic expansion between 1870 and 1890, particularly in 
the shipping and allied industries.  This was associated with increased production of 
raw materials, as well as diamond and gold mining in the interior, which generally 




Figure 1 Early Settlement in Durban 
 
 
The multi-cultural diversity of the city was linked to the presence of people of 
English, Zulu and Indian origins. The origin of South African Indians can be traced 
back to the agricultural labour requirements of colonial Natal in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which some have viewed as ‘a new form of slavery’.  The indentured labourers 
were followed by ‘passenger’ Indians who were mainly traders.  As Indians progressed 
economically they were perceived to be a threat to European interests.  The perceived 
‘social menace’ associated with the presence of Africans and Indians in Durban 
compelled municipal officers to wrestle constantly with ‘problems’ of crime, disease and 
                     
 4 Racial terminology in South Africa is a veritable minefield.  Any study of the South African social 
formation cannot avoid reference to race and ethnic divisions.  However, use of such terminology does 
not in any way legitimate racist ideology and doctrine. 
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sanitation, and influenced the development of segregation policies which culminated in 
the Group Areas Act (1950).  Historically, there was a great deal of conflict and 
contradictions between the white dominated local state (Indians and Africans were 
denied the franchise, and provided with minimal resources), the white elite and working 
class groups over labour, housing and `race' issues in Durban.  The anti-Indian 
agitation of the Durban City Council and its white electorate played an important role in 
the development of segregation legislation, especially the Group Areas Act (1950) 
(Maharaj, 1997a). 
 
A local debate ensued about whether the African proletariat should be accommodated 
in compounds and barracks close to their place of employment, or in locations outside 
the city.  Employers (industrial capital and the municipality) supported the former, while 
the native affairs bureaucracy and the superintendent of police supported the latter. 
White capital increasingly required a constant supply of cheap Black labour to support 
its manufacturing enterprises in the city.  The local state was not prepared to finance 
African housing from the municipal budget so that White capital interests could be 
supported.  It developed a unique ‘Durban system’ whereby African workers 
contributed to the cost of their own reproduction.  It established its own African eating 
houses as well as a monopoly on the sale of beer.  A separate Native Revenue 





Harold Wolpe’s 1972 essay on capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa 
describes the apartheid system as not only one of racial exclusion, but also a system 
of domination and control, intrinsically bent on reproducing and elaborating capitalist 
relations by maximizing cheap labour with little financial burden on the state. The 
increase of economic migrants and refugees in South Africa has a strong parallel to 
the world Wolpe (1972) described. In this case though it is a cheap labour pool 
without rights within a cheap labour pool of black South Africans; once again creating 
a situation in which some members of society are denied rights, without recourse to 
the state, subjected to bare life, and in this case policed through violence both by the 
state and by other poor South Africans who see themselves as bearers (and 
possible beneficiaries) of certain rights and concessions through the ANC-led state 
(Crush, 2001).  
 
Durban experienced a very large increase in African workers at the turn of the century, 
and in many respects served as a laboratory for competing doctrines and policies for 
social and political control of labour in the country.  By 1901 Durban had a population of 
55 000, comprising 15 000 Africans, 14 000 Indians and 26 000 whites, and this 
increased to 68 000 in 1904, with proportions of 19 000, 16 000 and 31 000 
respectively (Swanson, 1976:161).  Changes in the population composition and 
demography of Durban led to the development of a unique system of black urban 
administration, which had a major influence on municipalities throughout the Union.  A 
central concern of the local state was to control the rapidly growing African and Indian 
population in Durban, and this concern was commonly expressed in terms of the 
outbreak of diseases, insanitary conditions, and crime (Swanson, 1968:145). The local 
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state's attempts to control the labour force was met with increasing resistance and 
militancy by the African proletariat. 
 
The increasing resistance and militancy of the African working class threatened to 
undermine the local state's attempts to exert social control over the labour force.  
Between 1918 and 1920 the dockworkers and municipal workers were involved in 
numerous strikes.  This period was characterised by labour unrest and resistance 
nationwide.  In April 1918 Durban's `ricksha' pullers refused to work because of an 
increase in their vehicle rentals.  Under the leadership of J.L. Dube, President of the 
South African Native National Congress, and editor of Ilange lase Natal, many workers 
in other industries were demanding wage increases (Hemson, 1979).  The local state 
reacted by requesting the central state to take action against Dube.   
 
In July 1918 the railway workers were involved in strike action and the local state used 
the police force to intimidate the labourers, requesting the chief magistrate to intervene 
and the police to investigate potential instigators.  As a result, "the close networks 
between particular employers, municipal officials, and representatives of central 
government were lit up starkly in the suppression of working class action" (Hemson, 
1979:184). In fact, the local state, (a large employer of unskilled and semi-skilled 
African labour) entered into a pact with local capital in September 1919 to control wage 
increases.  However, as worker action became more militant, employers were forced to 
make individual concessions (Hemson, 1979). 
 
Ethnic competition and conflict - Indians versus Africans 
 
It has been conventionally argued that the abundant indigenous Zulu labour in Natal 
was inadequate and unsuitable for sugar plantations.  However, on the contrary, the 
local Zulus comprised a proficient labour force and were "by no means disinclined to 
labour, or unwilling to render it to the planters, but upon their own terms and at their 
own times" (Daily News, 13/11/60).  There is adequate evidence which reveals that 
while Natal was arranging for the introduction of indentured labour, the Zulus were 
working diligently in both the skilled and unskilled sectors of the economy (Meer, 1985; 
Dhupelia, 1982).  So the difficulty facing the planters was not a shortage of labour, but 
rather a lack of a plentiful supply of cheap labour.  The cost of Indian labour was high, 
especially in terms of costs of recruiting and travel to Natal.  This had the effect of 
lowering the wages paid to Africans, which was one of the reasons for introducing 
indentured labourers (Ginwala, 1974:26-7). 
 
For the first twenty years after the introduction of indenture, Indians probably 
constituted the poorest section of the Natal population.  During this period Africans 
were the main suppliers of basic foodstuffs such as maize, vegetables and kaffir corn.  
However, by 1882 these products were being produced almost entirely by Indians in 
the Natal coastal region. Indians managed to survive the economic and political 
onslaught primarily because of their cultural and religious heritage, and the importance 
the community attached to education.    
 
Hence, as the relative material circumstances of Indians improved with better access to 
markets with their produce, the African population became more impoverished.  Thus, 
by the end of the nineteenth century Africans replaced the Indians as the most indigent 
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at the bottom of the economic hierarchy (Ginwala, 1974:71-73).   
 
The wealth and business interests of the trader group was envied by whites as well as 
Africans. The limited number of African traders in urban areas resulted in Indian traders 
becoming very conspicuous.  African leaders argued that preference should be given to 
African traders in African areas.  Ethnic differences between Africans and Indians 
became more evident as Africans believed that all Indians had more privileges and 
opportunities than them (Kirk, 1983). 
 
However, what was often obscured was the fact that the majority of Indians belonged 
to the working class.  Surveys revealed that over 70 percent of the Indians were 
desperately poor.  Being semi-skilled and unskilled workers, their wages were low.  In 
addition, living in the joint family system, they had a large number of dependents 
(Ginwala, 1974).   Hence, a significant proportion of Indians did not benefit directly from 
the comparative advantages enjoyed by Indians as an ethnic group.  Their economic 
conditions were not much different from those of African workers (Ginwala, 1974).  In 
addition, there were various institutional factors which limited the employment 
opportunities of Indians and Africans.5 
 
Indians and Africans competed for jobs in the urban labour market.  The main area of 
competition was in secondary industry, were there was a large demand for unskilled 
labourers.  Indians had a comparative advantage over Africans in that they were more 
highly urbanised.  With their experience, Indians dominated in the semi-skilled and 
supervisory jobs which whites rejected.  However, except in the area of employment, 
the benefits which accrued to Indians were mainly in the interest of the bourgeois and 
petty bourgeois groups (Kirk, 1983: 30-33).  As a result of the relative advantages 
enjoyed by the Indians and their relative material progress vis-a-vis the Africans, Indo-
African relations in Natal were characterised by incipient tension and conflict. 
 
Both Indian and African political organisations did not do much to foster inter-group 
relations.  However, this began to change in the post-1945 period.  In 1947 a pact was 
formed between the South African Indian Congress (SAIC6, led by Dr Y. Dadoo), the 
NIC (lead by Dr G.M. Naicker), and the African National Congress (lead by Dr Xuma), 
to form a united front in opposing segregation and oppression.  The pact did not 
receive much support, especially from the African petty-bourgeoisie.  Selby Msimang, 
executive member of the Natal ANC stated that the "pact reflected a spirit of co-
operation only at leadership level", and that to the best of his knowledge, Dr Naicker 
had not done anything to promote co-operation (Mesthrie, 1989:42). A telling indictment 
against the political leadership of the period was the failure to mobilise across racial 
barriers: 
A study of the working class areas of Durban would surely reveal that 
even by the 1930s there was a considerable intermingling of African and 
                     
5 These included restrictions on movement between provinces; the Colour Bar; Apprenticeship Act of 
1944; and the `Civilised Labour' Policy.   
6 The SAIC was formed in 1923 and comprised the NIC, Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC, established in 
1927) and the Cape British Indian Council.  See Mesthrie (1989:42). 
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Indian workers.  Much of this was superficial - on the race track, in the 
cinema, or in the bus - but some was more durable, in terms of worker or 
home relationships.  This urban intermingling might have become the 
basis for a political movement, if the Indian leaders had not remained so 
completely middle class, whether they were moderates or radicals in their 
ideology (Tinker, 1973:525). 
 
The tensions and conflicts which characterised Indo-African relations were vividly 
played out in Cato Manor in 1949 and Inanda in 1985. 
 
Violence and Conflict – Cato Manor 
The history of settlement in Cato Manor is very complex, especially in terms of its race-
class configuration, types of legal and illegal tenure, and the extent to which the right to 
live in the area has been "fiercely and often violently contested" (Edwards, 1994:415).  
It is located within 5km from the CBD and is also very close to the industrial areas of 
Durban (Figure 2).  Cato Manor has traditionally been a mixed area, occupied mainly 
by Indian and Africans.  The history of Cato Manor is inextricably interwoven with the 
history of Durban.   
 
 
Figure 2  Location of Cato Manor in Durban  
(Source: http://www.cmda.org.za/annual_report_02/location.htm)  
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The area was originally owned by George Cato, the first mayor of Durban, and 
comprised of about 4 500 hectares (Edwards, 1989:7).  It consisted partly of a marshy, 
animal-infested jungle, although the land was variable in quality.  After completing their 
period of indenture, many pioneering Indians settled here and built simple houses from 
their modest earnings and savings, facilitated by pooled incomes from the joint family 
system.  They had purchased or leased their land from wealthy white farmers who had 
made lucrative profits from transactions with Indians. 
 
The conversion of undeveloped Cato Manor into a thriving, productive agricultural area 
resulted from the "effort of the Indian through industry, resourcefulness and thrift" 
(MIRA, 1958:4).  The Indians were mainly fruit farmers and market gardeners who 
ensured that Durban was adequately supplied with fresh fruit and vegetables at 
reasonable prices.  With the passage of time more Indians were attracted to Cato 
Manor and the area grew by leaps and bounds.  This was not unrelated to the fact that 
being located outside the jurisdiction of the DCC, they were able to erect substandard 
dwellings at low cost.  Schools, temples, mosques and halls were built and sustained 
through community initiatives in Cato Manor, without any assistance whatsoever from 
the state: 
 Its cultural and social centres included the Aryan Benevolent Home 
begun in 1918 and the Arya Samaj which was established in 1920.  The 
temples at 'First River' and 'Second River' were also early foci of Hindu 
activity.  Church groups, temple groups and school boards flourished 
(Chetty, 1990:12). 
   
In addition to Indians, the area had a large African population.  Africans began to move 
into Cato Manor in the early 1940s as they were ejected from areas like Overport and 
Puntans Hill by the DCC.  Many Indian farmers realised that they could make more 
profits by allowing Africans to build shacks on their lands, and many of them became 
`shacklords' (Edwards, 1983:4).  This arrangement was tacitly accepted by the City 
Council because the DCC was unable to provide alternative accommodation (Ladlau, 
1975).  Often Indians would let a huge plot of land to an African for a nominal site rent.  
The tenant would then sub-lease to hundreds of others who would build shacks and 
pay rent (Fighting Talk, August 1959).   
 
As a result, a large class of African `tenant-landlords' came into being, who had a 
vested interest in the continued existence of Cato Manor.  This group also operated 
`shack shops' in Cato Manor, and experienced a great deal of insecurity and 
competition:   
 They lead an insecure, harassed existence squeezed by the authorities 
on one side and by competition with Indian traders on the other.  These 
illegal traders and `tenant-landlords' form the social soil for the anti-Indian 
attitudes that one finds in the area (Fighting Talk, August 1959, p. 3). 
 
While the interaction between African workers and the Indian petty bourgeois was 
primarily exploitive, Indian businesses in Cato Manor provided opportunities for African 
workers and their families to escape from the austerities of direct local state control: 
Indian traders provided the basic infrastructure of the squatters' slums: the bus 
services and retail outlets - the services which could be provided 
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because of the particular position of Indian people as a `buffer group' in 
the racial hierarchy of urban segregation (Hemson, 1977:103). 
 
The incipient conflict between Africans and Indians in Cato Manor, however, burst into 
the open with the 1949 riots.  There were different interpretations of the cause of the 
riots (Kuper, 1965; Meer, 1969; Ladlau, 1975; Webster, 1978).  The state viewed the 
violence as a racial conflict between Indians and Africans (Union Government, 1949).  
However, while there was Indian-African tension, the riot was a "complex phenomenon, 
fed by white prejudice and Government policy as well as by the aspirations of an 
embryonic African bourgeoisie"(Ladlau, 1975:19).   
 
The riots were also attributed to the poor socio-economic and housing circumstances 
of Africans in Cato Manor.  Although Cato Manor was incorporated into the Borough of 
Durban in 1932, no attempt was made to upgrade the area, and it remained a 
chronically neglected area in terms of services and facilities for some years after 
consolidation.  At the time of incorporation there were about 2 500 Africans living in 500 
shacks.  Ten years later the population escalated to 17 000, and by 1948 there were 
about 29 000 Africans living in shacks in Cato Manor (Edwards, 1983:9).  In 1950 there 
were 6 000 shacks in Cato Manor housing 50 000 Africans (Maasdorp and Humphreys, 
1975:15).  The proximity of Cato Manor to the city centre and surrounding industrial 
zones contributed to the rapid development of shacks in the area (Maasdorp and 
Humpreys, 1975).   
 
Living conditions in Cato Manor were far from satisfactory.  The crime rate in the area 
was high.  The police were particularly concerned about the brewing of illicit liquor and 
shebeens, important components of the informal economy of Cato Manor.  There was 
overcrowding, inadequate health and sanitation services, and disease was rampant 
(Edwards, 1983).  The Durban Housing Survey (1952:372) stated that Cato Manor was 
"the spearhead of an attack on Durban's health", and described the area as follows: 
In general, the area has few water taps.  There are a few small and ill-
constructed pit latrines, but no system of drainage or rubbish removal.  
Waste water oozes from the shack surroundings to form stagnant pools.  
Vermin, flies, cockroaches and other pests flourish in the uncovered food, 
overflowing pits, neglected refuse dumped a few yards from the shacks 
and general filth.  Unsavoury odours cling to shacks and to whole areas. 
 
The Durban Housing Survey (1952) concluded that trade and industries had developed 
in the city without any consideration being given to the social and human 
consequences.  The contradictions embodied in Cato Manor, especially with regard to 
the contribution of its residents to the development of the city, and the responsibility of 
the DCC, is aptly conveyed by the following Sunday Tribune (16/6/57) editorial: 
 Cato Manor, with all its burden of pain and misery, its sick and dying 
children and its insanitary shacks, is Durban's responsibility.  A modern 
city, exemplifying all the highest standards of western civilisation, cannot 
disassociate itself from its gloomy satellite.  Durban also needs Cato 
Manor, or it needs the 100 000 people who live there, journeying into the 
city every day to contribute their labour to the general prosperity. 
 
Notwithstanding the poverty and despair, Cato Manor was home to its residents.  The 
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Durban Housing Survey (1952:375) noted that  
 there are many attempts to maintain pride and self-respect, which cannot 
fail to move deeply, and even hurt, a visitor to these homes.  Some dried 
mud or tin walls are painted and decorated with pictures cut from 
newspapers.  In more than one case the earth floor is covered with 
linoleum and the household linen unbelievable in its whiteness.  Actually, 
many interiors of shacks are remarkably clean and tidy, and seem to be 
out of tune with their environment. 
 
A major advantage of Cato Manor was that Africans were spared the controls which 
were imposed upon them in the locations.  The terrain occupied by Africans in Cato 
Manor was, however, contested space.  Although the area was owned by Indians, Cato 
Manor "became ever more central within the state's plans to allow the spatial and social 
features of Durban" (Edwards, 1989:192). 
 
Race Zoning, Protest, Resistance and Relocation 
 
In terms of the Asiatic Land Tenure Act (Ghetto Act) of 1946, Cato Manor was zoned 
for Indian ownership and occupation.  By 1950 some City Councillors and the Native 
Administration Department expressed concern about the future of Africans in Cato 
Manor.  While recognising that the area was primarily owned and occupied by Indians, 
the Native Administration Committee of the DCC suggested that separate zones for 
Indians and Africans should be set aside in Cato Manor (DCC Minutes, 20/11/50).  
However, the Committee recognised that "Cato Manor is ultimately to become an 
Indian area, and that permanent accommodation will have to be found for the Natives 
put there under a temporary controlled shack scheme" (Durban Housing Survey, 
1952:380).   
 
The DCC subsequently obtained central state consent to expropriate 450 acres of land 
in Cato Manor, as well as a loan of 153 000 pounds towards the costs to provide 
temporary accommodation (later known as the Cato Manor Emergency Camp) for 
Africans.  The main purpose of this gesture was to ensure that the shack lands of Cato 
Manor were cleared.  However, the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd, 
emphasised that the central state would never support permanent African housing in 
Cato Manor as the area would be zoned white in terms of the Group Areas Act (Daily 
News, 24/4/51).    
 
In 1952 the DCC recommended that Cato Manor should be zoned as a white group 
area.  In spite of objections from Indian political and civic organisations, Cato Manor 
was proclaimed a group area for white ownership and occupation in 1958 (Figure 2).  
The DCC was forced to reconsider its 1952 recommendation as the financial 
implications of group area relocations became apparent.  In June 1958 it resolved that 
a 'more realistic approach' be adopted to race zoning in the city, with emphasis on the 
"minimum disturbance of the existing population" (DCC Minutes, 5/6/58).  As a 
compromise the DCC recommended that a portion of Cato Manor which was 
predominantly Indian owned and occupied should be zoned for this group.  This 
proposal was rejected by the government (Figure 3).  By the early 1960s there was 
evidence of increased central state control over local authorities, and the space for 
local opposition to central policies was significantly reduced.  The weak apartheid state 
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of 1948 was very much in control by the early 1960s (Maharaj, 1994). 
 
Removals from Cato Manor commenced in March 1958 and was almost finished by 
August 1965.  During this period 6 062 shacks were destroyed, and 82 826 Africans 
were officially relocated in the new townships of Kwa Mashu and Umlazi.  It was  
 
 
Figure 3 Group Areas Act 1950 –Racial Apartheid Zoning in Durban (Source: 







estimated that 30 000 to 40 000 people disappeared, "either returning to their rural 
areas or else taking up illegal residence elsewhere in the city" (Maasdorp and 
Humphreys, 1975:61). 
 
The removals were resisted by the communities.  'Illegal residents' who were in Durban 
without permits felt that they were being deprived of their rights to live in the city.  
Others who were engaged in selling liquor and other illicit activities felt that their 
livelihoods were being threatened.  The main reason for the resistance was that the 
cost of living would be higher in the townships, especially with regard to rent and 
transport expenditure (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1975). 
 
In April 1959 residents protested against the razing of shacks at Mnyasana, bringing a 
temporary halt to the relocation process.  In June 1959 spontaneous protest action in 
the Cato Manor Emergency Camp resulted in the destruction of buildings and facilities 
and beerhall riots.  The rioting and boycott of beerhalls was sustained up to November 
1959.  While the ANC played a role in the protest action, it was mainly 'initiated by the 
underclass - illicit entrepreneurs and women for whom municipal shack demolition and 
removals posed an absolute threat to continued city residence" (Edwards, 1989:196).  
Removals were resumed in November 1959, under police protection.  By the end of 
1959 about 10 600 people had been relocated (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1978:62), and the 
"fate of Mkhumbane had finally been settled" (Edwards, 1989:317).  The majority of 
Africans were moved to Kwa Mashu and Umlazi. 
 
A major problem was the lack of organised protest action and resistance: 
 Although the municipality was to have difficulty in applying municipal 
policy in the shantytowns, the struggle over the ultimate future of the 
shack lands was decided with an almost complete lack of organised 
African resistance.  Despite shack resident asserting their desire to 
remain in their conquered space, there was no clear political strategy and 
a lack of any clear leadership.  Furthermore, existing African political 
organisations, especially the African National Congress, did not have the 
political will to struggle for the Mkhumbane shantytowns (Edwards, 
1989:207). 
 
In January 1960 nine policemen who were involved in a liquor raid were killed in Cato 
Manor.  The state of emergency introduced after the Sharpville7 riots resulted in a 
reduction resistance action in Cato Manor as residents were unable to counter the 
repressive power of the state.  There was a further change in attitude in early 1961 
when between 400 and 500 families were requesting to be moved to Kwa Mashu.  
There were two possible reasons for this change in attitude: 
The official explanation ... was that the residents realised that they would be 
leaving the squalor and overcrowding of Durban's worst slum area, but a 
more likely explanation is that they realised the inevitability of 
resettlement and thus attempted to get into the queue for new housing as 
                     
7 On the 21st March 1960 the apartheid armed forces fired against a crowd of Anti-Pass supporters 
resulting in 69 dead and 180 seriously wounded.  
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soon as possible.  Moreover, occupation of a municipal house would end 
any insecurity they might have felt about their right to reside in the urban 
area (Maasdorp and Humphreys, 1975:63). 
 
Indian political organisations were vociferous in their condemnation of, and opposition 
to, the GAA and being uprooted from Cato Manor.  They resolved to mobilise their 
resources, and to use every available avenue of protest to oppose the implementation 
of the GAA, and to defy the unprecedented assault on basic human rights and 
privileges.  In an atmosphere of increasing hostility and intolerance these organisations 
utilised peaceful measures, which included recourse to law, passive resistance and 
appeals to India and the United Nations, to expose the injustice and violation of human 
rights in South Africa.  The Mayville Indian Ratepayers' Association (MIRA) made an 
emotional appeal to the DCC and the government, emphasising the attachment of 
people to place and community: 
 People form deep and lasting attachments to the places in which they 
live and such attachments are rooted in emotional association with 
homes, temples, churches, mosques, schools, burial places and with 
neighbours - years of friendship, the passing on of homes from 
generation to generation.  Such are worthwhile values which cannot be 
set aside lightly.  Is it fair to ask people, now advanced in years, to break 
up old associations and homes, businesses, etc. and to start afresh.  
Besides, can monetary compensation, even though seemingly adequate, 
take the place of homes, businesses, etc.?  Enforced removal must 
necessarily bring resentment and resentment can be so very easily 
smoulder into hate (MIRA, 1958:2, original emphasis).   
 
Although they claimed to represent the Indian community, there was very little evidence 
of mobilisation of the working class.  This was because segregation presented an 
immediate threat to middle class Indians, and political action and resistance was 
directed to protecting the interests of this group.  For the poor there was the possibility 
of being housed in municipal housing schemes and a relief from the high levels of 
exploitation from the Indian landlords (Maharaj, 1992). 
 
The main reason for the failure of resistance to the zoning of Cato Manor for Indians 
was the repressive state apparatus.  Many Indian political leaders were arrested and 
were being tried for High Treason.  The majority of Indians were low income labourers 
who were afraid of being arrested, and the consequent loss of jobs, earnings and family 
support associated with political activism (Maharaj, 1995). 
 
The leadership vacuum in the Indian community that developed in the struggle to 
oppose the GAA was filled by civic and ratepayer organisations, a trend which 
continues to the present time.  These organisations tried in vain to oppose relocation 
through mass protest meetings, petitions and negotiations, in spite of being berated 
and humiliated by the Government.   
 
The Leader (24/7/81) described the relocation process as follows: 
These mass removals are affected in a manner that reflects an almost uncaring 
attitude on the part of those who make the decisions to move people hither and 
thither ... It is almost as if humans are being used as pawns and moved into 
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white and black squares by a manipulator who plans and plots to achieve a 
desired objective.  He annihilates and sacrifices to that all important end.  But 
this is no game that is being played.  Human lives are involved and the very 
core of community life is being seriously affected.  Everything that has been built 
up over many years, and decades, is destroyed ... leaving in its wake 
resentment, enmity, despair and pain. 
 
Cato Manor vividly illustrates the nature of local state, its abdication of critical roles, 
and the social relations between the Indian and African communities. The 1949 riots 
were a key incident which shaped social relations in Durban, and was used by the 
apartheid government to justify racial residential segregation. Since then, there was 
incipient tensions in the relations between Indians and Africans in Durban and this 
flared up again with the 1985 Inanda riots. 
 
 
The 1985 Inanda Riots 
 
In Inanda the first two decades of growth took place without any formal authority 
structure. The Durban City Council protested that Inanda falls outside the Durban 
municipal area and therefore was not its responsibility. The fact that Inanda "has more 
than a century been used by the Durban economy as both a labour reserve and 
dumping ground for the ‘economically expired’ was conveniently forgotten” (Makhatini, 
1991:3). The state on the other hand, claimed that it was the onus of the landowners 
themselves to develop Inanda as they were housing squatters for personal profit 
(Makhatini, 1991). 
 
In the absence of a formal authority structure the relationship which came to be 
established between landlord -retailers (mostly Indian) and tenant - consumers (mostly 
African) was one in which the landlord cum-retailer wielded a significant amount of 
power in the area, and especially over the condition of their tenants. Often the landlord 
threatened the very presence of the tenants in the area. Many tenants reported that the 
landlords had a dictatorial attitude to them and tried to control their daily lives (Meer, 
1985, Hughes, 1987a). 
 
The state also deepened lines of fracture between Indian landlords and tenants by 
forcing them to provide services or evict tenants. This was done at a time when the 
State was touting a plan to expropriate Indian owned land. It is significant that the state 
did not call on African landlords to provide services. The State was keen to draw 
Inanda into the KwaZulu Bantustan, as much of the land available in this area was 
under the tutelage of tribal authorities.  The cost of consolidation would involve paying 
compensation to 326 Indian landowners. A few Indian landowners sold their properties 
before the violence. Many hesitated because of the inadequate compensation offered. 
 
There was no real community of interests between Indian and African tenants. When 
African residents found employment it was at the lowest rungs of the employment 
hierarchy. The majority of people employed in the formal sector were semi-skilled and 
non-manual labourers. Indian workers unfettered by legal constraints in terms of their 
movement in the city and being better educated through community and state aided 
schools had increased chances not only of finding a job, but also of moving up the job 
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hierarchy. Often Indian tenants were seen to be favoured in their relationship with 
Indian landlords. In any case, many of the 2 000 or so Indian tenants bore some 
familial relation to the landlord. 
 
By the mid-1980's relations between Indian landlords and African tenants was 
becoming increasingly tense.  At the beginning of 1984, newspapers reported that 
Indian landowners were being molested, threatened and victimised by African tenants. 
Under banner headlines like ‘Inanda time bomb' Indian tenants complained that they 
were being assaulted (Sunday Tribune Herald, 26/2/84). 
 
The Department of Community Development received reports of the `acute possibility 
of Indian women being raped'. The central apartheid government appealed to the 
Durban City Council to rehouse the 4 500 Indians living in Inanda. The state was 
probably keen to consolidate Inanda into the KwaZulu bantustan. It would be a further 
step in the development of the homeland system.8 It would also mean that capital 
would continue to have access to African labour without the state having to concede 
Section 10 rights.9 The KwaZulu government was also pressurising the state to give it 
control over Inanda. This was one of the few areas surrounding Durban that did not fall 
under its jurisdiction. The removal of Indian presence would smooth the process of 
consolidation. However, the City Council refused to rehouse the Indian residents. It 
argued that it already had a waiting list of 17 500 families and the Inanda residents was 
not its liability (Natal Mercury, 28/2/84). 
 
The spark for the violence was the assassination of a prominent UDF leader, Victoria 
Mxenge outside her house in the African township of Umlazi. Protesting the 
assassination, a school strike and boycott spread out of Umlazi and engulfed Kwa 
Mashu, Clermont, Lamontville and Inanda in quick succession. Whilst the spark that set 
off the spiral of violence was the assassination, the form that the violence took 
displayed a significant degree of specificity in the different areas.  
 
In Inanda gangs of youth began threatening Indian shopkeepers, landlords and 
residents. The threats gave rise to mass panic. When, on 6 August, two Indian-owned 
shops and houses were looted and burnt, hundreds of Indians left Inanda and sought 
refuge in the adjoining Indian township of Phoenix. By the end of the week 42 
Indian-owned shops and businesses and as many houses were destroyed, whilst 2000 
Indian refugees pondered their future in Phoenix. The media and many in the Indian 
community billed Inanda 1985 as a repeat of the 1949 riots. 
 
On the night of 5 August, a group of youths besieged the house of a policeman in 
Ntuzuma, a township adjacent to Inanda. The policeman fatally shot one of the youths, 
and the “following day the `rolling strike', now enraged, reached Inanda” (Hughes, 
1987b:348). That afternoon the looting of Indian-owned shops began. This pattern was 
to continue through Wednesday and Thursday. An eyewitness reported that on 
                     
8 South Africa’s indigenous Africans were denied citizenship but were, legally considered citizens of 
one of the ten tribally based self-governing ‘bantustans ‘commonly known as homeland.  Four of 
these homelands became independent states. 
9 The Black (Natives) Laws Amendment Act of 1952 prescribed that African people over the age of 16 
had to carry passes, and no person could stay in an urban area for more than 72 hours unless 
allowed to by Section 10. 
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Wednesday "at about 1 pm a mob besieged the Phoenix Cash Store and looted it once 
the owner, Ebrahim Jeebhai, left. They went on a kilometre further to loot Laljeeth 
Rattan's store and then into two Indian homes" (Meer,1985, p 155). Businessman 
Ranjith Ramnarain was informed on Wednesday that family and friends were trapped 
in Inanda. An initial rescue attempt was repulsed by a stone-throwing crowd. Fully 
armed, he made a second more successful attempt by riding with a shotgun in a truck: 
"It had been a rough ride. It was frightening because at Ntuzuma crossing we were 
stoned and then when we got to Inanda near Cassim's store it happened again" (Natal 
Mercury, 7/8/1985). The scene that greeted Ramnarain when he got to Inanda was the 
burnt out shells of buses and cars still in their parking lots. Ramnarain's own house lay 
in ruins. The only thing left untouched was the temple in the yard, with the red flag 
dedicated to the Hindu god, Hanuman, still adorning the roof. 
  
Another family told of how they begged a military contingent to give them protection 
while they moved their family and some of their belongings. The military refused. "They 
did not even get off their vehicles and left after stopping by for about two minutes." The 
family managed to get away. The next day, Thursday, at about 1:30 pm, when 
members of the family returned to collect what remained, they saw the Casspirs 
(military vehicles) stationed in front of the shop, but when a building opposite was about 
to be attacked by a mob, the Casspirs disappeared. The shop was burnt soon 
thereafter. It seemed to them that the Casspirs were almost protecting the crowds in 
their burning and looting (Meer, 1985:159). 
 
As over a thousand Indian refugees made their way into Phoenix, tensions and anger 
heightened in the sprawling township on Friday, 9 August, armed groups massed on 
both sides of the Inanda/Phoenix divide `spoiling' for a fight. Whilst the confrontation did 
not materialise, both sides followed each other in ransacking and ultimately destroying   
the Gandhi Phoenix Settlement - a shrine of peace. As Hughes (1987b:350) 
comments: "The tragic symbolism of the burning of the Gandhi Settlement went far 
beyond the immediate act of the violent destruction of a `place of peace'. It signified 
also the void of political organisations and ideas on all sides of the Group areas divide, 
which could have allayed, or at least toned down, the confrontations". It is tragically 
ironic that it was at the Settlement that ‘peace camps’ were held to bridge racial divides 
in the early 1970's. 
 
While the drama unfolded at the Gandhi Settlement, a new factor had entered the fray. 
A resident in Ntuzuma reported on Friday 9th that Inkatha10 supporters armed with 
sticks were going house to house, trying to persuade people to join them. "They are 
taking anybody. They say they are people they want to kill" (Daily News, 9.8.1985). 
Inkatha impis11 armed with spears began to engage UDF12 - aligned youth in 
KwaMashu and Umlazi. By Saturday they had seized control of both areas. 
                     
8 It is a reference to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) formed in 1975 with wide support from the Zulu 
ethnic group in KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP is a political organization which encourages Zulu nationalism. 
 Inkatha has a symbolic meaning in Zulu culture as it represents the spiritual and political powers of 
Zulu kings. 
11 Impi is a group of Zulu Warriors who arm themselves with traditional weapons (sticks, spears, 
pangas). 
12 It is an acronym for the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was a national non-racial coalition of 
civic, church, students', workers', sports bodies and other organisations (national, regional and local) 
established in 1983 to oppose apartheid.  
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The Lindelani impi which had tamed KwaMashu now turned their attention to Inanda. 
The impi, however, met with sustained resistance. A series of attacks was beaten off by 
Inanda residents. Many in Inanda turned against Inkatha since the attacks were carried 
out in its name. 
 
On Sunday l2th August Inkatha called a meeting to establish peace in the Phoenix and 
Inanda areas. About 5000 supporters and 1000 Indians attended the meeting. Oscar 
Dhlomo, General Secretary of Inkatha told the meeting that Inkatha had taken control 
of the townships in order to put an end to the violence, to protect property, public 
buildings and business (Sitas l986:111-112). The last incident of violence in Inanda, 
identifiable as part of the August upsurge, came exactly a week after it had all begun. 
On Tuesday, l3th August, the burnt bodies of three - Indian men were found on the 
Phoenix / Inanda border. They were all from the same family: a father, his son, and his 
brother in-law (Hughes, 1987b:351). This brought the death toll to 70. 
 
In order to understand why the violence took a particular form it is necessary to focus 
on the social relations that prevailed in Inanda at the time of the uprising. The 
discussion will focus mainly on the nature of the relationships between Indian landlords 
and African tenants and landlords. 
 
Indian and African landlords and retailers did not develop an `alliance of interests'. 
Rather the relationship was competitive and often antagonistic. Africans were restricted 
from acquiring more land through the provisions of the 1913 Land Act. Indians, their 
own attempt to expand within the confines of central Durban curtailed by legislation, 
began to turn to places like Inanda. ‘Protected' from competition by Africans, Indians 
were able to expand their landowning and trader interests.  
 
When the influx of squatters started in the early 1960's, the African petit-bourgeoisie 
wanted a share of the market. They saw the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 
of 1959 as a means not only to break into the lucrative market provided by the 
squatters but also as a weapon to completely wipe-out Indian competition. AWG 
Champion, the ANC leaders of the 1940's re-emerged in the 1960's as the 
propagandist of this position. Hughes (1987a:4) points out that Champion and other 
African landlords and traders "couched their class protectionism in explicitly anti-Indian 
terms". Champion, a resident of Inanda, sought to remind the residents of the area that 
"when Indians were very arrogant, the Africans took sticks to them in 1949... They beat 
them up and made them close their shops. Yes, the enrichment of Africans from stores 
and buses started in 1949, it started like that...."(Hughes, 1987a: 4). 
 
Following the passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, African 
petit-bourgeoisie interests sought a dominant share of the spoils in Inanda. Champion 
welcomed the legislation: "The Government today insists on separation. The beauty of 
this policy to me is our obtaining a way to build up industries in the area where we live" 
(Sitas, 1986:90). 
 
African traders were organised into an association called Inyanda. After initial hesitation 
Inyanda joined Inkatha in August, 1976. The affiliation of Inyanda to Inkatha brought a 
new dimension into the fray. Inkatha over the years had failed to make any inroads into 
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Inanda (the UDF by August l985 had no substantial presence either). Incorporation was 
perceived to be a quick ` fix ' to this problem as policing and local government function 
would fall into the hands of the KwaZulu government. Hence, the interests of Inyanda 
and Inkatha coalesced. Incorporation would remove Indian competition swiftly. 
 
Inkatha thrived on ethnic politics, and Inanda was no exception. For Inkatha the 
affiliation was one more brick in the building of the Zulu nation. The interests of the Zulu 
nation had to be weighed up against the interests of the Indian nation. Buthelezi was 
prone to using the ethnic card. He had accused the UDF of being manipulated by the 
Indians. When criticised by students at the University of Durban Westville (a 
predominantly Indian institution at the time) he reminded Indians of what had happened 
in 1949. Mare and Hamilton (1987:151-152) point out that racism and racial 
stereotyping had emerged in KwaZulu and Inkatha politics at different times. Thus, 
Buthelezi, in an obvious reference to the Natal Indian congress, argued that there is "an 
African level (of fighting apartheid) whose dynamics can only be grasped by Africans", 
and that "Africans resent being seen just as a mass of brown, that must be guided by 
the brains of other race groups” (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:11-152). 
 
Chief Sithole told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) that "when the Congress 
(ANC) was composed only of Africans, there were no problems, but the trouble started 
when different nations were allowed to join. We must be wary of these Indians because 
they want to use us as their tools, as a ladder for them to reach their goals" (Mare and 
Hamilton, 1987:151-152). This ethnic chauvinism was particularly inflammatory given 
the fragility of social relations in Inanda. 
 
The state meanwhile was arguing that it could only support development in Inanda if 
Indians moved out. This would allow for land to be incorporated into KwaZulu. Indian 
tenants were keen to move but only if they were given access to subsidised state 
housing. Indian landlords and shopkeepers demanded adequate compensation. Thus, 
the KwaZulu government, the central state and African business interests had a stake 
in the removal of the Indian presence in Inanda.  
 
Desegregating the City: 1980s 
 
Against the background of the post-197613 era, the material and social conditions in the 
relocated townships soon provided the impetus for civic movements to pressurise the 
Durban City Council (DCC) for concessions and political changes.  In the periphery and 
buffer zones land invasions escalated and informal settlements were burgeoning.  Also, 
rigid race-space divisions were blurred as blacks began to infiltrate white residential 
areas.   
 
 
i) The Development of Grey Areas 
 
In the 1980s, de jure white residential exclusivity was being contravened as large 
numbers of blacks began to move into designated white group areas, and this led to 
                     
13 The 16th June 1976 is a major landmark in history of South Africa. It marked the era in which the 
youth of the country revolted against apartheid education and its oppressive racial policies.  The 16th 
June in the post-apartheid era is commemorated as national youth day. 
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the formation of so called `grey areas' in most major urban centres in South Africa 
(Elder, 1990).  Three factors contributed to the development of `grey' areas in Durban 
and other South African cities: 
i)With the process of suburbanisation, whites were moving from the inner cities 
to the suburbs, even before the influx of blacks into the area.  There was a 
declining interest in inner city flatland as well as a movement to areas that had 
once been rural. 
ii)There was a surplus of accommodation for whites, and landlords were forced 
to accept black tenants, who were experiencing a tremendous shortage of 
housing.  Hence, landlords and black tenants were responding to market forces.  
The Group Areas Act created an artificial shortage of land and housing for 
blacks. 
iii)In the post-1976 era there was an improvement in socio-economic status of 
blacks (as the apartheid government tried to create a black middle-class), who 
were seeking a better quality of life, away from dormitory, strife-torn townships 
(Maharaj and Mpungose, 1994:30). 
 
In Durban black tenants living in grey areas were subjected to constant threats of 
eviction.  The Durban Central Residents' Association (DCRA) was formed in 1984 to 
oppose eviction of such tenants.  It played a key role in mobilising, organising and 
protecting the rights of black tenants in Albert Park and other parts of the city.  
 
The reaction of DCC to the development of `grey areas' in the city can best be 
described as ambivalent and contradictory.  In May 1986 the DCC resolved to request 
the Government to scrap the operation of the Group Areas Act in the city.  Failing this, 
the DCC requested that it be granted the authority and flexibility to implement the Act in 
the city (Maharaj and Mpungose, 1994). 
  
Conservative Councillors argued that the repeal of the Group Areas Act was a matter 
for the central Government to decide, and that it should not be discussed by the DCC.  
Liberal Councillors referred to the possible implications if the DCC dragged its feet over 
the matter, warning that the Council could "get rid of Group Areas voluntarily, and make 
a small contribution to relations, or wait for violence, consumer boycotts, and 
commerce in chaos to force us" (Natal Mercury, 20/5/86).  In August 1987 the DCC 
protested to central government against the eviction of blacks from white areas in 
Durban. 
 
In March 1989 the Management Committee of the Council recommended to following 
alternative options to the DCC with regard to residential integration: 
i) The Government be requested to declare Durban a non-racial city. 
ii) No part of the city should be declared free settlement areas. 
iii) Specific parts of the city should be declared free settlement areas (Maharaj and 
Mpungose, 1994). 
 
However, the issue ended in deadlock when none of the above options were accepted.  
The stalemate reflected the clear divisions in opinion held by the different power blocs 
on the Council.  Councillors on the political left supported a motion to declare the whole 
of Durban a free settlement area.  Such a move, they argued, would demonstrate to 
the Government that the Council supported a reform policy which would ultimately lead 
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to the abolition of the legislation.  Councillor Bruce Boaden maintained that "Durban 
should be able to show its face to the rest of the world as the city which has cast aside 
apartheid" (Natal Mercury, 4/4/89). 
 
Councillors on the political right maintained that no existing residential areas should be 
opened, in accordance with the mandate they had received from the municipal 
elections of October 1988.  The primary concern was to protect the interests of the 
white working class.  Their views were summarised by Councillor Arthur Morris who 
contended that "it was all very well for the upper class of the Berea who had high walls 
and security systems" to call for total residential desegregation.  He expressed concern 
about the white working class who would be forced "to live cheek by jowl with lower 
class people" of other races (Natal Mercury, 4/4/89). 
 
The DCC's debate was interpreted as the beginnings of a move for a non-racial city.  
The Council debate had separated those who favoured a democratic city and those 
who supported the status quo.  However, while whites spent a great deal of time 
discussing the integration of facilities, such changes only emerged as a result of 
initiatives from blacks (Maharaj and Mpungose, 1994). 
 
It is claimed that the departure of White residents and the arrival of Africans in the 
metropolis cascaded into the so-called decline of the central areas. It is alleged that 
Durban’s inner city has become a place of perdition, violence and vice. It has 
become a lucrative destination for organised global crime syndicates, provides a 
fertile opportunity for social miscreants (street children, pavement dwellers, beggars 
etc) to reproduce themselves resulting in financial loss to the business sector, 
causing them to relocate to suburban areas. These and other social problems are 
blamed for the decline in the central areas, prompting business flight to the rich 
suburban areas. In Cape Town, it is alleged that such a phenomenon does not exist 
in the central area and consequently has a very positive image.  In Johannesburg, 
the same simplistic arguments are maintained to explain the decline of the central 
areas (Guillaume, 2002:10). Hence, the assertion that the decline of the central 
areas emanates from social composition of new entrants into the city is refuted. 
 
Violence and its visual materialisation are one of the main generators of such 
stereotypes. It  is an established fact that South African metropolises and the central 
areas tend to have a higher incidence of crime and violence compared to the former 
townships. The sight of street traders, who were formerly prohibited by the apartheid 
regime from plying their informal trade, street children, pavement dwellers, sex 
workers and drug dealers in the Point  and West Street areas have strengthened the 
negative perception of the Inner City. Many newspaper articles and television reports 
have amplified the idea of a “ghettoisation” of the Central Areas. People  associated 
the decline of the Inner City with the arrival of West African immigrants, more 
particularly Nigerians. Even if some Nigerians are actual drug lords, the extent of 
xenophobic attitudes was undoubtedly diffused and transferred onto all immigrants.   
It would appear expedient to scapegoat crime and violence to be more an issue-
involving foreigners instead of coming to terms with the complex dynamics emerging 
in the post-apartheid South African city through rapid integration into the rest of the 
globe especially in Africa. Even among the most progressive spheres, this crime 




ii) Land Invasions/Informal Settlements 
 
The 1980s saw a massive influx of migrants into the Durban region.  During apartheid 
planning, large vacant land, known as buffer zones, separated white suburbs from 
black townships.  During the 1980s the black townships had experienced an increase 
in backyard shack dwellings, which expanded on vacant land on the peripheries of 
white suburbs.  Given the shortage of formal housing for the poor, the only 
accommodation available in Durban was in informal settlements.  Also, violence and 
crime in the townships and rising unemployment precipitated movement of people to 
vacant land in the inner city, and open land occupations and invasions replaced 
clandestine squatting (Hindson, Byerley and Morris, 1994; Hindson and McCarthy, 
1994). 
 
In June 1987 the DCC debated the problems of squatter communities and accepted 
the Housing and Health Committee's recommendation that the settlements should be 
accepted as permanent.  However, towards the end of June 1987 the DCC appeared 
to somersault on its earlier decision.  Squatters in Wentworth, Clare Estate and 
Reservoir Hills had their shacks demolished by the police, and many were arrested and 
charged for trespassing.  According to Councillor Winter the DCC was unable to 
prevent the eviction of squatters from private property (Daily News, 6/6/87).   
 
In the late 1980s, a further stage of squatting began in inner city areas such as Clare 
Estate and Cato Manor in Durban.  While spatially the racial impress of the apartheid 
city was changed by this process as blacks moved into a former white area, it had little 
social effect on the new black residents, as they were excluded from access to virtually 
all facilities and social institutions within the neighbouring white suburbs in terms of 
apartheid laws (Saff, 1994:328). DCC officials subsequently stated that "the city must 
accept that urbanisation and the attendant squatter problems are part of its future" 
(Daily News, 12/4/89). 
 
Cato Manor itself became a highly contested terrain (Edwards, 1994).  All the groups 
removed from Cato Manor in the 1950s and 1960s staked moral claims to some form 
of right in the resettlement and development of the area.  These claims were made on 
a racial basis.  Indian families that remained in the area were able to realize this claim 
in the form of new housing constructed for them in Bonella by the House of Delegates.  
New groups of African invaders were also staking claims.  Cato Manor is a large and 
undeveloped piece of land that is attractive to many low-income residents in the 
Durban functional region.  Aspirant home-owners from the metropolitan periphery were 
rapidly invading the area (Hindson and Makhathini, 1993; Hindson and Byerley, 1993).  
In spite of the competing interests, there was a view that Cato Manor could become the 
microcosm of a new non-racial society where people live in a peaceful, inter-cultural 
and democratic setting, contributing to nation-building and unity in the new South Africa 
(Gigaba and Maharaj, 1996). 
 
The illegal occupation of land raised fears and anxieties amongst middle and lower 
income groups and even relatively better off township residents and this has led in 
some instances to racial and class based conflict.  The expansion of the informal 
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settlements on the fringes of affluent areas had a profound effect on the property 
values of these suburbs.  In Cato Manor the residents of the affluent Manor Gardens 
suburb demanded an interfaced development as compared to low cost housing in 
order to retain the value of their property.  The Manor Gardens residents made it clear 
that they were not opposed to black housing development on their borders, but were 
concerned purely in terms of their property being devalued.  Although some wanted to 
sell their properties and move out, banks would not provide finance due to the large 
informal settlements surrounding their homes (Maharaj and Khan, 1998). 
 
Land invasions in Durban and other cities have largely taken place on land adjacent to 
existing townships, on the periphery of urban areas.  More recently, the urban poor 
began moving towards the city-core areas, mainly on land surrounding Indian and 
coloured suburbs. These invasions have tended "to reinforce the broad apartheid 
geography of the cities rather than fundamentally challenge it" (Mabin, 1992:21-2). 
Indeed, as Figure 4 indicates, fifteen years after the historic 1994 elections, apartheid 
legacy areas remain largely unchanged (Schensul, 2009). 
 
There were also problems in the inner city which were frequently associated with 
changing economic, political and social forces in urban areas, which operate at local, 
national and international levels (Diamond, 1991).  More than three decades ago, 
Forrest et al. (1979:111) that reference to inner-city problems has become a 
convenient "shorthand for a combination of bad housing conditions, vandalism, racial 
conflict, a declining economic base, decaying infrastructure, high unemployment, 
and vacant and high priced land". A major social consequence of this "phenomenon 
has been the concentration in the inner city of what is frequently termed an  
‘underclass’ population.  These are the poor and the disadvantaged who find it 
difficult to participate in the changing urban economy" (Diamond, 1991:219). 
 
The South African experience is no different, where "overcrowding, social and racial 
tension, degrading residential stock and community facilities, in short the creation of 
inner city ghettos, are a very real threat to the substantial existing social and 
economic infrastructure" in the inner city areas.i Inner-city problems in South Africa 
are perceived to be "both a creation of apartheid and a phenomenon of the post-  
apartheid era" (Olufemi, 1998:228), and this has been aptly summarised by the 
following Daily News (4/10/99) editorial: 
The situation which has now developed in our inner cities was, of course, 
inevitable.  After denying the majority of the population access to homes close 
to their work and forcing them to travel long distances each day, it was natural 
that, given the opportunity for the first time, people would flock to the city and, 
because of poor salaries, be forced into overcrowding their accommodation.  
The challenge now is to offer incentives to demotivated landlords to clean up 
vandalised blocks, cultivate a spirit of pride in ownership and of surroundings 
and involve the community in rooting out bad elements which makes the 
streets unsafe. 
 
One of the causes of the decline of Durban's CBD was the international trend 
favouring suburban shopping malls and decentralised offices. Basically, "capital 
disinvestment has created a space for those excluded from formal economic activity 








iii)  Social Movements and Urban Change 
 
The 1980s were characterised by a reform of apartheid in the urban arena.  The 
devolution of power from the centre to local levels was one of the key components of 
the state's reform strategy.  The decentralisation of administrative functions to local 
black township councils required a massive increase in the local revenue base and was 
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accompanied by major increases in rents, property taxation and other township 
revenues (Morris and Padayachee, 1988; Seethal, 1991; Lupton, 1992).  These 
increases precipitated widespread urban protests and rent boycotts, spearheaded by 
the civics, actions which dominated the urban political arena from the mid-1980s. 
 
Civic protests around collective consumption issues (rent, housing, transport) 
dominated the urban political arena in the 1980s.  The urban locale, and in particular 
the local state, became a contested terrain.  Although rent boycotts started as protest 
movements, they soon provided the catalyst for civics to explore alternative local 
government structures which would transform the apartheid city.  This represented the 
beginnings of a move for a more democratic, non-racial local government. 
 
In Durban two major civic organisations, the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) and 
the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) were formed in the early 1980s, and 
were "structured largely along racial lines because of the discrete geographical area 
and bureaucratic structures that Africans and Indians respectively operate within, and 
must therefore confront" (McCarthy, 1985:11).  JORAC opposed the Port Natal 
Administration Board rent increases in African townships around the Durban region, 
and resisted the planned incorporation of these townships into the KwaZulu bantustan 
(Reintges, 1990). 
 
The DHAC was formed in March 1980 in response to the DCC's decision to increase 
rents in public housing.  In Durban the apartheid local state initially ignored the DHAC's 
request that rent increases be reviewed, and the civic was branded as being radical.  
However, as the DHAC's capacity to mobilise thousands of residents and the reality of 
a rent boycott became apparent, the DCC was forced to negotiate with the civics.  By 
demonstrating its capacity for mass action the DHAC forced the local state at various 
stages to negotiate with it and to temporarily defer rent increases in 1980-81, 1985 and 
1987-88.  Clearly, the DHAC's pragmatism and willingness to negotiate with local state 
officials and to participate in local state structures and forums, dispelled the state's 
attempts to discredit.  These campaigns in the coloured and Indian areas served by the 
late 1980s as a catalyst for the development of a non-racial alliance opposing the high 
rents for public housing imposed by the local state (Maharaj, 1996a).   
 
Housing issues, especially rents and affordability, have been central concerns for civics 
in South Africa because blacks were denied land tenure in urban areas until 1986.  In 
Durban, coloureds and Indians were forced to relocate in segregated public housing 
estates like Phoenix, Chatsworth and Newlands East in terms of the Group Areas Act 
(1950).  The local state attempted to dominate residents in public housing estates by 
imposing unbearable rent increases.  Residents opposed these increases.  Hence, 
public housing estates constituted a `terrain of resistance' (Routledge, 1993).  The 
housing issue also served as a catalyst for the formation of a multi-class, non-racial, 
populist alliance and the emergence of metropolitan integration in Durban.  In 
consequence, local housing issues involved a challenge to apartheid at the highest 
levels. 
 
Despite their geographic and seemingly racial emphasis, DHAC and JORAC worked 
closely together and were further aligned through their affiliation to the United 
Democratic Front in 1983.  Civic organisations like the DHAC and JORAC served as 
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important agents of social change and initiated a shift towards a non-racial local 
government.  They also contributed towards the development of collective political 
consciousness across race barriers.  A major factor facilitating mobilisation was 
material - the incapacity of the people to pay increasing rents in Durban.  While the 
focus was on local problems, the civics were aware that these issues were inextricably 
linked to the apartheid central state.  Hence, the civics consciously advanced non-
violent strategies - mass meetings, demonstrations, marches, boycotts and petitions - 
that advanced the struggle for national political change.  The mode of resistance was 
non-violent (Maharaj, 1996a).   
 
The DHAC and its affiliates were also at the vanguard of the demands for a non-racial 
city - a move which gained considerable impetus following the unbanning of the African 
National Congress in February 1990, and the commencement of negotiations for a 
non-racial, democratic South Africa.   
 
 
Deracialising the City: 1990s 
 
The collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s and the imminent prospects of democracy 
brought about immense pressures for the deracialisation of South African cities.  In 
Durban, the local state was forced to respond to a multitude of problems and demands 
as it attempted to come to terms with burgeoning numbers, a depressed economy, 
political demands for a non-racial city from civic organisations with strong grassroots, 
and land claims from those who had been dispossessed under apartheid. 
 
 
i) Campaign for a Democratic City 
 
On 10 March 1990 a number of civic organisations including the DHAC, Westville 
Residents' Support Group, Berea Residents' Association, and Lamontville Residents' 
Association met to discuss strategies for non-racial local government in the Durban 
area.  At the meeting many speakers highlighted the unequal allocation of resources in 
black areas, and attributed this to being disenfranchised. The meeting noted the 
necessity for a non-racial local government, representative of all communities in 
Durban, and called for the boundaries of the city to be redefined. 
 
The vehicle to achieve these objectives was the Campaign for a Democratic City 
(CDC).   The CDC was formally launched on the 29 September 1991 and was 
supported by about 75 civic groups, straddling race, class and geographic boundaries.  
The CDC resolved to strive for: 
i) the eradication of apartheid local government structures in the Durban region; 
ii) the realisation of a non-racial, democratic and equitable local government based on 
a common non-racial voters roll; 
iii) the immediate improvement in the living conditions of the over three million people 
who inhabited the region (Maharaj, 1996a). 
 
The launch of the CDC was welcomed as it focused "attention on the true meaning of 
democracy in municipal government" and served as "watch dogs in this period before 
transition and also at all stages until democracy is truly established in municipal affairs" 
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(Leader, 27/9/91).  Local government analysts viewed the campaign "as the most 
serious attempt yet to change the face of South Africa, and really establish the `new 
South Africa' (Natal Mercury, 5/10/91).   
 
The CDC strongly opposed the racial allocation of public housing in the city.  In a 
memorandum, the DCC was asked to formulate a new non-racial list, so that vacant 
dwellings could be allotted to those in need.14 Councillor Mona Riddle, chairperson of 
the Community Services Committee, replied that the non-racial housing allocation had 
been accepted in principle by the DCC, but that the municipal restructuring process had 
delayed its implementation (Daily News, 27/6/91).  At a meeting held on 10 July 1991 a 
sub-committee comprising representatives from the CDC and the Community Services 
Committee was formed to develop a new non-racial housing list.  The CDC was 
satisfied with the outcome of the meeting, particularly as they would be involved in the 
decision-making process (Daily News, 11/7/91).  This represented a penetration of the 
apartheid local state by the civics. 
 
However, a major obstacle with regard to these housing lists appeared to be at the 
central state level.  The DCC questioned the central state about maintaining three 
separate lists, and threatened to obtain a Supreme Court order to force the central 
state to draw up a non-racial housing waiting list.  The central government replied that 
"housing was still an `own affair' and segregation will remain until a new constitution 
was in place" (Natal Mercury, 10/8/91). 
 
The closer working relationship between the DCC and civics led the latter to believe 
that there was a change of style in the way the DCC operated, but not of heart.  For 
example, Deputy Mayor Margaret Winter stated the DCC was more inclined to 
recognise civics as an important constituency in the city, whereas previously they were 
viewed as a nuisance.  Councillor Peter Mansfield believed that with a more 
enlightened leadership, a gradual change of heart was taking place within the DCC.  
However, he conceded that many conservative councillors were unable to face the 
future.  He maintained that the DCC would benefit a great deal from negotiating with 
the civics, especially in terms of democracy and accountability: 
 We are operating from different perspectives.  The civics are sometimes hyper-
democratic, which could be a result of a lack of decision-making experience, 
but they have brought us a concern with accountability that has been lacking in 
local government.  We will most likely end with a compromise between the two 
(Weekly Mail, 21-27/2/92). 
 
Parallel to the campaign for a democratic city, the DCC was also taking initiatives to 
restructure local government. 
 
 
ii) Restructuring Local Government 
 
Municipal politics in Durban in the 1980s and early 1990s was "characterised by 
numerous shifts in alliances, parties enjoying short-lived majority control of the Council, 
                     
  14 There were about 100 vacant Council flats in white areas (Sunday Tribune, 7/7/91). 
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and very tenuous balances (Rogerson 1995:142).  By mid-1990 an alliance between 
the National Party (NP), right wing, and independent councillors ensured that for the 
first time in its history the NP gained control of the DCC. Traditionally, the city was 
controlled by liberals who were opposed to the National Party. However, by October 
1990, Mayor Venter was reviewing his association with the conservative alliance in the 
DCC which brought him to power.  Venter supported President De Klerk's reforms, and 
gave them a local ambience by initiating dialogue between the region's key political 
players (Maharaj, 1997b). 
 
The challenge for Durban was to initiate processes which would not only guarantee the 
results of national political negotiations but would also reinforce that outcome at the 
local level (Mkhwanazi, 1990:2).  On 15 October 1990 the DCC adopted an 
unambiguous mission statement which "committed itself to pursuing the restructuring of 
local government on a non-racial and democratic basis within the context of a unitary 
and democratically governed South Africa" (Natal Mercury, 16/10/90; DCC Minutes, 
15/10/90).  
 
In addition to political restructuring, the employment policy of the DCC had to be 
revised. The DCC had a history of racist employment practices which favoured whites 
at the expense of blacks.  There was a clear class, race and gender stratification of the 
Council's labour force.  Africans and Indians presently make up the bulk of the general 
staff and basic skilled staff, white women dominate as secretaries and clerks, and white 
males were dominant at the middle and senior management levels.  Given the political 
changes and pressure from trade unions, the DCC was forced to committing itself to 
adopt and implement affirmative action policies so that its staff began to reflect the race 
and gender composition of the communities they served (Maharaj, 1997b).   
 
In September 1993 the DCC adopted a "Charter of intent for an affirmative change 
process" which was approved by the different stakeholders in the Durban municipality 
(including unions).  The following 'vision statement' was adopted by the Charter: "The 
Council, both the workforce and the body politic, reflects the demographics of the 
region and creates opportunity for all people to achieve their full potential" (Durban City 
Council, 1993:1).   According to the Durban Integrated Municipal Employers Society 
(DIMES) "affirmative action15 will involve transforming the ethos, quality and content of 
local government to help reverse the legacy of inequality, under resourcing and 
impoverishment of an apartheid environment" (DIMES, 1994:40). 
 
Elections for democratic local government elections in South Africa took place on 1 
November 1995.  However, elections in KwaZulu-Natal only took place on 26 June 
1996 because of administrative problems and the high level of political intolerance and 
violence. In spite of these problems, the 26 June elections in KwaZulu-Natal was 
'substantially free and fair'.  As expected, the ANC was successful in the major urban 
areas, and the IFP in the rural areas.  Against the background of the political conflict, 
violence and instability, the relatively peaceful local elections marked the beginning of a 
new era which would focus on reconstruction, development and planning. 
                     
15 Affirmative action is a way of making the workplace more representative and fair. In the South 
African context, Indians, Africans and Coloureds are considered as candidates for affirmative action in 
the workplace. It ensures that qualified people from these designated groups have equal opportunities 
in the workplace. 
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In the democratic era new non-racial local authorities in the Durban region faced major 
challenges as they focused on urban reconstruction and development strategies to 
address the socio-spatial distortions of the apartheid era.  Central government control 
over local development planning has been reduced, with an increased emphasis on 
local and regional economic strategies as South African cities try to alleviate the high 
levels of unemployment and poverty in the country (Maharaj and Ramballi, 1996; 
Rogerson, 1997).   
 
In Durban the International Convention Centre and Point Redevelopment Project were 
part of the DCC's strategic planning initiative to form an alliance between local 
government and the private sector to help save the region's ailing economy. These 
projects were underpinned by a protocol to address past inequalities, with policies for 
affirmative action, stable job creation and levelling of playing fields (Maharaj and 
Ramballi, 1998). 
 
It was envisaged that these projects would influence a significant increase in 
international tourism, which would create one new job for every eleven visitors and also 
bring foreign currency into the country. This money would have a multiplier effect of 5 
to 7 times (Mercury, 16/12/92). 
 
However, all these predictions of thousands of employment opportunities did not 
consider the cyclical nature, low paying and unstable jobs that were created by the 
tourism-convention centre industry. Local (the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront project in 
Cape Town) and international examples illustrate that additional or long term, stable 
jobs were not created (Loftman and Nevin, 1996).  New jobs were not created but were 
merely redistributed to white suburbanites and not the low income groups.  Hence, 
there would be limited direct benefits for the disadvantaged communities in the Durban 
region from the Point redevelopment and convention centre projects. (Maharaj and 
Ramballi, 1998).  Grant and Kohler (1996:539) have similarly concluded that the 
"unrealistic plans which characterise the Point reconstruction programme are 
problematic and unlikely to benefit those most in need". 
 
 
iii)   Land Claims and Restitution 
 
Although a number of processes have been responsible for the inequitable distribution 
of political power and wealth in South Africa, it has been argued that the dispossession 
of land was the most important for most black communities.  With the demise of the 
Group Areas Act and the Land Act serious attention has focused on plans to 
reconstruct some of the areas which were destroyed by the legislation.  The Restitution 
of Land Rights Act of 1994 provided a mechanism to address the land dispossession 
that occurred during the apartheid era. In an era of reconstruction, development and 
planning, land restitution can be regarded as an opportunity to heal the scars resulting 
from apartheid planning and forced removals. In Durban, Cato Manor represented one 
of the largest urban claims (3 000).  However, plans are well in advance for the 
reconstruction and development of Cato Manor into a model non-racial environment.  A 
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non-profit Section 21.16 company, the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) 
was formed to administer the project (Khan and Maharaj, 1998). 
 
Section 34 of the Restitution Act allows local authorities to apply to the Land Claims 
Court to prevent restoration of property to original owners who were displaced by 
apartheid laws, if this was perceived as not being in the public interest.  In August 1996 
the Durban Metro made a Section 34 application to stop restoration in Cato Manor.    
 
The CMDA's policy framework for the development of Cato Manor envisages the 
provision of between 30 000 to 40 000 houses for middle to low income people over a 
ten year period, catering for their economic and social needs.  Land restoration would 
impede development progress, therefore the CMDA was in favour of restitution 
(alternate sites) which would accommodate claimants in its land allocations policy.  
However, there was no mention of the historically dispossessed in the CMDA's land 
allocation policy.  The CMDA argued that the project was in the public interest because 
it would deliver affordable housing; provide economic benefits; influence the 
environment and would be a model for the future.  Although there were some 
impressive plans for the development of Cato Manor, there was little tangible progress 
in implementation (Ramballi, 1997).  The Land Claims Hearings were costly and time 
consuming, and the local authority was forced to negotiate with the claimants. The 
Chief Land Claims Commissioner Joe Seremane warned that the "claimants rights to 
restitution should not be sacrificed on the altar of ambitious plans that disregard the 
needs and rights of dispossessed citizens" (Media Release, 3/2/97). The essence of 
the Cato Manor agreement concluded in April 1997 was that where feasible restoration 
must be incorporated in the development plans for the area (Ramballi and Maharaj, 
1997). The majority of claimants settled for cash compensation. 
 
In Durban the Cato Manor land claims hearings confirmed the need for negotiations 
and consultation before development plans are drawn for land with potential restitution 




iv) Political Contestations in Durban 
Durban is located in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), one of the most densely populated regions 
of the country, with one in every four South Africans living in it (Maharaj, 1997b). The 
1980s saw a massive influx of migrants into the Durban region, and it has often been 
referred to as the fastest growing city in the world.  In 1995 the population of the 
Durban Metropolitan Region was estimated to be 2,3 million (City of Durban, 1995:22). 
According to the 2011 census the population of Durban was 3,442,361, and 66% are 
under 35 years. The majority African group comprise73.8%, Indians 16.7%, Whites 
6.6%, and Coloureds 2.5% (eThekwini Municipality, 2014:20-21).  
 
Durban reflected the cutting edge of many problems facing the country, of which the 
                     
 16 Organisations registered in terms of the Companies Act which are not for commercial purposes or for gain. 
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most crucial challenges were the provision of housing and employment.  In addition, 
the Durban region had been wrecked by endemic violence since the 1980s (Morris and 
Hindson, 1992).  The high levels of crime and violence in the region had a major impact 
on growth and development as investment in the region was being inhibited and 
development projects in the townships were being disrupted (Coleman, 1995:49). In 
the 2014/2015 annual report approximately 2, 3 million crimes were reported to the 
South African Police Services (SAPS). 
 
The challenges facing democratic non-racial local authorities in South Africa as 
identified by Bennington and Hartley (1994:7-8) had a special resonance for the city of 
Durban: 
i) how to democratise local government to ensure that it would be non-racial and 
legitimately representative of all people; 
ii) how to engender an adequately solid political alliance between the numerous 
competing (and sometimes conflicting interests) at local, regional and central 
levels; 
iii) how to develop new structures in local government which would manage and 
deliver services to communities disadvantaged by apartheid and also 
contribute to urban reconstruction and development; 
iv) how to restructure the workforce through training and retraining existing 
employees, and affirmative action recruitment, to ensure that there is a racial 
and gender balance. 
 
The question of democratising local government and establishing equity may be 
viewed as a terrain with compounded impediments. For example, women of the 
Durban Metro Negotiating Forum expressed their frustration at the prevalence of 
sexism and the lack of gender sensitivity (Harper, 1995).   
 
In terms of the LGTA the Greater Durban Metropolitan Negotiating Forum (GDMNF) 
was established in June 1994, and comprised sixty-six local authorities.  One of the 
key issues that the Forum had to address was the determination of the boundaries of 
the metropolitan area. More specifically, the adoption of the boundaries was based 
on the following considerations: 
i) The restructuring and amalgamation of black and white local authorities. 
ii) The future financial viability of the metropolitan area. 
iii) The functionality of the metropolitan system in economic, spatial and social 
terms. 
iv)       The redistribution of resources and upliftment of disadvantaged areas.17   
 
Political contestation between the ANC and the IFP resulted in the Durban region being 
wrecked by endemic violence since the 1980s.  Elections for democratic local 
government elections in South Africa took place on 1 November 1995.  However, 
elections in KwaZulu-Natal only took place on 26 June 1996 because of administrative 
problems and the high level of political intolerance and violence. In spite of these 
problems, the 26 June elections in KwaZulu-Natal was 'substantially free and fair'. This 
was influenced by a major peace effort initiated by religious leaders and supported by 
                     
17 Understanding the Durban Metropolitan Area Demarcation Process (1993-1996), Support 
Document 3, August 1999, p.7. 
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all political parties, as well as a strong police and army presence.  There were minor 
incidents of intimidation as well some organisational problems. As expected, the ANC 
was successful in the major urban areas, and the IFP in the rural areas. 
 
In spite of the political conflict, violence and instability, the relatively peaceful local 
elections marked the beginning of a new era which would focus on reconstruction, 
development and planning. While there was a new democratic council, there was 
concern about the lack of delivery and the great expectations of the people.   
 
A major concern as acknowledged in the White Paper on Local Government (1998) 
was that women were under-represented as local government councillors. In order to 
remedy this, the White Paper on Local Government proposed that political parties 
introduce a gender quota of 50 percent on their party’s proportional representation 
list. It encouraged political parties to ensure that in the next three municipal elections 
at least half of the candidates on the party list were woman (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998; van Donk, 1998). The Municipal Structures Act (1998) also 
called for equal representation of women and other marginalised groups.  However, 
it did not explicitly demand equal representation on ward and proportional lists. As a 
result, fewer women featured as ward candidates, and hence even fewer were voted 
into wards (Stucky, 1999).  
 
The ANC had imposed a 50/50 quota of males and females on their Proportional 
Representation (PR) listing in the 1995 local government elections because the party 
leadership felt that women stood little chance of winning as ward councilors against 
male candidates. This highlighted the problem of entrenched chauvinism and 
resulted in a lack of visibility of women in wards (Stucky, 1999). However, first-past-
the post constituency-based electoral system has proved disadvantageous to 
women candidates as they were often unable to break through the electorate’s 
stereotyping of women in traditional roles which did not envisage them as political 
leaders (Fick, 1999). 
 
A major problem was disagreement over the role of traditional leaders or chiefs.  The 
IFP wanted tribal areas to be excluded from metropolitan boundaries).  The matter was 
referred to the Electoral Court in November 1995 which ruled in favour of the IFP 
because there had not been adequate consultation and discussion with traditional 
leaders about whether the disputed areas could be included in urban councils.   
 
v) Urban Tribal Authority Areas and Political Violence 
 
The institution of traditional leadership has historically been usurped by both the 
colonial and apartheid regimes to assert their political hegemony resulting in 
approximately 85% of the land being alienated and a system of self-governance 
implemented to minister white minority rule. This system of governance 
characterized and shaped the indigenous South African landscape into homelands, 
bantustans and urban black townships. At the dawn of democracy these black 
spaces played itself out violently to assert itself in the new political dispensation. 
South Africa is known to have some 800 ruling chiefs supported by 1 000 headmen 
and when combined have jurisdiction over 18 million people or approximately 40% of 
the population who are largely rural (Daily News, 22/09/2000).  The post-apartheid 
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government upon coming to power in 1994 provided a new sense of vitality for this 
institution in Section 12 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). As consequence, these 
opposing forms of modern systems and traditional forms of governance has been an 
ongoing source of political conflict since democracy particularly in KwaZulu-Natal 
between traditional leaders and the state on the question of the exact roles and 
responsibilities of the latter in service delivery at a local government level (Khan, 
Lootvoet and Vawda, 2006). 
 
Fuelling the complexity contained in the traditional systems of governance at an 
urban level was the extension of the metropolitan area of Durban to include 16 tribal 
areas just before the 2000 local government elections.  Durban is the only metropolis 
in the country that encounters traditional leaders in an urban setting. Despite intense 
opposition from traditional leaders to the Demarcation Board on the inclusion of land 
that has historically been under their administrative tutelage, the surface area (2297 
km2) of Durban Metropolitan Region (DMR) was extended by 68% compared to the 
previous Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA), (1366 km2). The expansion of the 
metropolis on traditional territory was a source of violent conflict on the exact role of 
traditional leaders as against that of democratically elected councilors at both 
institutional and political levels, since the major prerogative of service delivery rests 
with local government (Khan, Lootvoet and Vawda, 2006). 
 
Competing interest in service delivery has been a source of constant political conflict 
between the state and traditional leaders, which gained increased momentum just 
before the second local government elections held on 5 December 2000. The most 
controversial issue that escalated into conflict was the proposed amendment to the 
Municipal Structures Act (1998) (Daily News, 28/11/2000), which aimed to restrict 
the role and functions of traditional leaders in local government to that of customary 
law and community matters.  This amendment provoked strong opposition from 
traditional leaders who felt that their functions were being defined no different to that 
in the apartheid-era (The Mercury, 6/11/2000). 
 
While the state tinkers on formulating appropriate statutes to regulate the role and 
function of traditional leaders, Durban in particular has taken decisive steps to 
accommodate traditional leaders onto its council, long before the Traditional Leaders 
and Governance Bill was approved by parliament. Currently, a traditional leadership 
forum has been established to consult on the development priorities in the tribal 
areas. Ironically, an ANC councilor acts as a go between the leaders, and the 
metropolitan council chairs the forum. Traditional leaders already enjoy a monthly 
allowance of R3 500 per month from the council to cover their administrative costs 
but as yet do not enjoy formal representation except through the chair of the forum. 
From this turn of events it appears that traditional leaders are being inducted into the 
boardroom politics of the council. For the moment, the issue of traditional leaders is 
no longer being tested out in the rough terrain of the urban hinterland but in the 
boardrooms of the metropolitan council. At least for now these boardroom novices 
are being schooled by ANC cadres for the politics that is yet to unfold in the corridors 
of the city hall (Khan, Lootvoet and Vawda, 2006).  
 
Although it may appear that traditional leaders have been co-opted into Durban’s 
glittery boardroom politics in the spirit of good governance and service delivery 
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through a forum, it is questionable as to whether this participatory structure is 
representative of all traditional leaders. In an interview with the chair of the traditional 
leader’s forum that is an ANC councilor, scant respect was accorded for the 
justification of such an institution existing in the new democracy. The sentiments of 
this ‘city father’ is well captured in the following quotation from an interview: 
 
…traditional leaders should not think that they enjoy special privilege due to 
their status…. Similarly, Indians, Whites and Coloureds should be given a 
similar privilege due to their religious and customary practices’. Their ‘claim to 
special citizens in the country’ was looked upon scornfully and those who stay 
out of the forum were branded the ‘mischievous ones’. With such strong 
perceptions, the prospect for dissent on governance and service delivery 
issues is likely to embitter progress made towards co-operative governance 
(Khan, Lootvoet and Vawda, 2006: 111). 
 
However, although on the surface it would appear that commendable progress was 
made towards co-operative governance between traditional leaders and the 
metropolitan council, the maturity of relationship was tested out once again as the 
nation geared itself for the third local government elections in March 2006. The KZN 
agenda for a constitution making process was plunged into controversy during April 
2005, once again on the role of traditional leaders and the Zulu monarch in a future 
dispensation. Some 5000 traditional leaders and their followers protested on the 
streets of Durban denouncing the marginalisation of traditional authority in the 
proposed provincial constitution resulting in it being passed by a one third ANC 
majority, as the IFP walked out of the process (Khan, Lootvoet and Vawda, 2006).   
 
Whilst one is inclined to believe that the relationship between traditional leaders and 
modern forms of governance has begun to mature, one begins to doubt such an 
assertion when traditional-weapon clad marchers show open resentment towards 
democratically elected councilors having more power compared to them. Statements 
such as “the indunas and kings are our tradition” (Mail and Guardian, 8/4/2005) is a 
strong indication of the volatility besieging the institution of traditional leadership 
which is unleashed at politically strategic junctures in order to preserve its traditional 
hegemony.  
 
The issue of traditional authority land usage and management is far from complete. 
In the Durban Metropolitan Area, service delivery and development programs in the 
16 tribal authority areas is highly contested resulting in conflict on service delivery 
issues.  Ironically, on the anniversary of the fourth national government elections, the 
issue of traditional leadership and their land has become a contested political issue.  
Political posturing to win the support of the traditional authority constituency has 
resulted in promises to revisit land restitution claims as far back to the 1913 Land Act 
which alienated property from the former disenfranchised black populace.  In KZN 
the Zulu King has recently announced that the ruling party has to expedite such 
dated land claims which once again will reinvigorate the hegemony of the tribal 
authority system.  The consequence for the metropolitan area of Durban at a political 
level places it at risk once again for violent confrontation with ruling ANC local 
government in the forthcoming 2014 elections.  There were also disputes and 





vi) Contesting Boundary Delimitations 
 
In Durban the socio-spatial distortions of the apartheid era will have to be addressed 
through a more equitable distribution of resources, and the re-drawing of 
geographical boundaries. In terms of the LGTA the Greater Durban Metropolitan 
Negotiating Forum (GDMNF) was established in June 1994, and comprised sixty-six 
local authorities.  One of the key issues that the Forum had to address was the 
determination of the boundaries of the metropolitan area. There were divergent 
views relating to the “inclusion or exclusion of tribal authority land located on the 
edge of the existing metro boundary … a result of the interwoven nature of the 
geographic sub-regions of the former province of Natal and the former homeland of 
KwaZulu” (Pillay, 1999:207). The exclusion of the majority of tribal areas suited the 
interests of the governing Inkatha Freedom Party in KZN. 
 
It was clear from the Durban and other experiences that it was possible to 
manipulate transitional interim measures by "excluding settlements on the periphery 
of the metropolis which would lower the per capita tax base, and place a strain on 
service delivery capacity; demarcating local boundaries to create (or perpetuate) 
stark differences in per capita tax base between localities" (Wooldridge, 2002:132).  
 
In terms of the Municipal Demarcation Act (1998) the independent Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB) was established to determine the criteria and procedures 
for the delimitation of municipal boundaries (Sutcliffe, 2002).  According to the MDB’s 
criteria the existing metropolitan boundaries in Durban were not cohesive or 
integrated, and were unsustainable economically: 
The demarcation of the present boundary has not helped to resolve all of the 
problems associated with service delivery and infrastructure in areas outside 
the urban core, especially in informally settled areas.  Poverty, inadequate 
housing and infrastructure, land tenure, unemployment, crime, a lack of skills 
and environmental problems continue to manifest themselves in these areas, 
which remain functionally linked to the Metro core.18 
 
There was also the suspicion that the MDB's draft proposals had political 
undertones.  The inclusion of large rural areas adjacent to the metro could reduce 
the support base of the IFP in a region where the ANC controlled the Metro but not 
the province.  Some of the traditional authorities were also concerned about losing 
their powers and jurisdictional influence.  Tensions were further heightened between 
urban and rural regions because traditional leaders believed that their territorial 
jurisdiction and authority were being undermined as the administrative geography 
was radically redefined by the Municipal Demarcation Board. 
 
                     
18 Durban Metropolitan Area Boundary Submission to the Municipal Demarcation Board, 25 August 
1999, p.15. 
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Figure 5 Durban Boundaries Changes (Source: eThekwini Municipality, 
2016:87) 
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Many boundaries had been hastily drawn and were unviable and unsustainable, both 
administratively as well as in terms of service delivery.  Also, in many traditional 
authority areas there was no democratic accountability.  In order for reasonable 
service delivery these areas have to be integrated with local municipalities.  
 
Durban was opposed to the spatial extension of their boundaries because of the 
costs of providing services and infrastructure in the deprived margins.  Similarly, 
there was concern that incorporation of rural areas will result in increased municipal 
service charges being imposed on these communities. 
 
The final determination by the MDB for the Durban Metro (renamed eThekwini 
Unicity) area (Figure 5) revealed that it had only deviated marginally from its original 
proposals.  The geographic size of the Metro had increased by 931 sq km, with an 
increased population of 229 742, comprising 36 388 households.  The draft budget 
of the Unicity for 2002 revealed that there were financial difficulties in providing basic 
facilities and service for the newly incorporated rural areas which did not generate a 
commensurate rates revenue (Mchunu, 2002a).  There were also difficulties in 
providing adequate policing services for these communities (Mchunu, 2002b).  
Affluent metro authorities like that in Durban were opposed to the spatial extension 
of their boundaries because of the costs of providing services and infrastructure in 
the deprived margins.    
 
Basically, those with resources (largely the largesse of apartheid) attempted to 
insulate themselves from the larger socio-spatial fabric, and demonstrated a 
reluctance to share and redistribute resources.  Similarly, there was concern that 
incorporation of rural areas will result in increased municipal service charges being 
imposed on these communities.  Tensions were further heightened between urban 
and rural regions because traditional leaders believed that their territorial jurisdiction 
and authority were being undermined as the administrative geography was radically 
redefined by the Municipal Demarcation Board. 
  
While the municipal demarcation was largely successful in eliminating the political 
geography of apartheid at a macro-scale, the greater challenge for the Durban local 
authority is to reduce the socio-spatial and economic inequalities which appears to 
be very high and perhaps increasing.  
 
vii)  Racial Desegregation and Class Polarisation 
 
An analysis of residential segregation and desegregation is important because race 
played a key structural role in the socio-spatial organisation of South African society.  
Although the Group Areas Act was abolished in 1991, the scars and imprints of the Act 
will be strongly evident on the South African urban landscape for a long time to come, 
and this is especially evident in Durban.   
 
In the post-apartheid era, racial segregation has been perpetuated, if not been 
replaced, by class segregation, which in many ways, reinforces the spatial disparities 
and fragmentations of apartheid (Bremner, 2000b; Popke and Ballard, 2003; 
Lemanski, 2007). The transition from racial apartheid to class segregation has been 
linked to neoliberal policies in the democratic era democracy (Turok and Watson, 
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2001; Watson, 2002).  In the post-apartheid era only the middle income blacks have 
upward residential mobility resulting in more desegregated suburbs and 
homogenous townships. Financial status plays a role in determining where people 
live in the city, which in many ways reinforces socio-spatial patterns reminiscent of 
those of the apartheid era.  
 
Schensul (2008) contended that in Durban, similar to many developing and middle-
income cities globally, there are social and fiscal, forces which limit socio-spatial 
transformation. The isolation of blacks within the townships reinforces the 
disadvantages of the apartheid era as the democratic government has largely failed 
to address socio-economic challenges and legacies of the apartheid era: 
The whole of Durban evokes a powerful sense of being two or three cities at 
once, but certainly not one … life in Durban’s communities is powerfully 
unevenly distributed, differentiated into multiple distinct city types, separated 
by a combination of race, class, and spatial divisions born under apartheid 
and changing or remaining static in complex ways after apartheid. 
Understanding the pace and type of change and stasis, and how the state’s 
intervention has impacted Durban’s disparate developmental trajectories are 
the central goals of this dissertation (Schensul, 2009:3). 
 
A quality of life study conducted by the city administration between 1998 and 2005 
revealed that about 50 percent of households in Durban were unable to pay for 
health care, education, shelter, water and electricity.19 The study estimated that the 
basic essentials for a family of four would cost R1500.  In 2005, about 45 percent 
earned less that than R1500 per month.20 In this group 20 percent earned less than 
R1157 per month and were referred to as being ‘ultra poor’.21 Poverty was highly 
gendered – 58 percent of the women were poor compared to 29 percent of the men. 
Also, the probability of women falling into the ‘ultra poor’ category was three times 
that of men (Casale and Thurlow, 1999:7). Further evidence of economic 
vulnerability was that 81.8 percent of residents in Durban were unable to save any 
money after meeting their monthly household costs (SACN, 2004:93).  
 
With huge social inequalities, even bigger than in 1996, followed by high levels of 
violence, paranoia has engulfed the rich resulting in the creation of protected, safe 
and private spaces. Commonly referred to as `gated communities’ they aim to 
exclude the remaining population from their neighborhoods. In these communities 
the streets are cordoned off by private security companies. Public access to the 
residences are regulated. In addition, residences in these areas are heavily fenced 
with large security walls, electronic security systems and surveillance equipment. 
Some of these gated communities are to be found on former buffer zones, on the 
margins of the historically white residential suburbs. The idea is to have an artificial 
public space within a private property. The extent to which people can afford to live 
in such ‘gated residential suburbs’ has now become the guarantor of safety in 
suburban living. Hence the private sector is subtly an active player in the re-
segregation process. 
 
                     
19 The Quality of Life of Durban’s People, Trends:1998-2005, (eThekwini Municipality), p. 28. 
20 ibid., p. 27. 
21 eThekwini Municipality Integrated Development Plan Review, 2005/2006, p.18. 
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In the last few years, South Africa has experienced a substantial increase in its 
property market.  At the end of the 1980’s, Real Estate agencies were criticized for 
their tendency to perpetuate the Group Areas Act principles and patterns through, for 
example, steering (Maharaj, 1993) Like in many metropolises around the world, the 
market law supports or intensifies the process of class re-segregation, based on land 
and property values and thus on affordability.  Real estate prices have broken 
records for the last few years and have reinforced a separation between households 
“who can afford” and those who cannot.  
 
viii)   Health and Housing  
 
The majority of blacks are forced to live in informal settlements which lack basic 
amenities such as water and sanitation - living conditions which create a whole network 
of ill health. In Durban an estimated 257 000 households (one third of the total 
population in the city) live in shacks in 540 ‘recognised’ informal settlements.22  Such 
settlements are also more susceptible to natural disasters such as flood and fires 
(SACN, 2004). 
 
Apart from the discriminatory legislation, structural violence, low wages, and 
unemployment that contribute to squatting, the inhabitants of the informal settlements 
have to contend with living in structures which offer only partial shelter against the 
elements, and have no, or inadequate, access to basic facilities such as water, 
sanitation, and refuse removal (Hindson and McCarthy, 1994).  The majority of informal 
settlements in Durban did not have piped sewerage or indoor water, and the majority of 
the households dumped their refuse in piles outside their dwelling before burning it.   
 
In Durban the demands of accelerated urbanisation, particularly with regard to health 
care, is compounded by the legacy of apartheid planning which has resulted in health 
service provision being fragmented along racial, administrative financial and spatial 
lines.  While urbanisation offers the promise of improved opportunities and a better 
lifestyle, the urban poor generally find themselves living in conditions which are 
detrimental to their health. 
 
Early in 1997, the Chairperson of the Durban Metro Health and Housing Committee, 
Councillor Bheki Mbatha drew attention to the health problems in the Durban: 
 Without adequate containment of diseases and disease-causing 
conditions, the Metro areas growth in aspects such as job creation, 
economic development and tourism will be severely limited.  It is 
therefore essential that primary health care services play a pivotal role in 
any development strategy and that local government continues to take 
responsibility for and expand these services in the Metro.  The injustices 
of the past necessitates that primary health care providers focus their 
attention on issues of social injustice with particular emphasis on 
disadvantaged groups within the community (Cunnan and Maharaj, 
2000: 699).  
 
A devastating health issue is the scourge of HIV/AIDS. There was an HIV prevalence 
                     
22 eThekwini Economic Review, 2006/2007, p. 57. 
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rate of 29-32 percent in urban areas in South Africa (SACN, 2004). However, in Durban 
the infection rate was 39 percent in 2004/5, the highest in the country.23 AIDS related 
deaths tend to perpetuate a vicious cycle of poverty, inequality and social exclusion, 
and women and children are most vulnerable. More so in Durban than in the rest of 
the country, local government must integrate the consequences (cost, impact on the 
structure of the skilled labour market, etc.) represented by the scourge of AIDS into 
the economic and social development policies. More resources will have to be 
allocated to addressing the consequences of HIV, including the “burden of sickness, 
hospitalisation, orphans, and social welfare”.24 
 
In Durban, and the rest of South Africa, health must be approached from a holistic 
perspective with an emphasis on sanitation, immunization, and nutrition which should 
be related to the provision of purified water, shelter, income generation, security and a 
good, clean environment. The government will have to take cognisance of the 
thousands of people who resort to living in informal settlements to be near the city 
centre with the hope of obtaining employment and a better quality of life.  Ignoring the 
such settlements means ignoring the basic needs of millions of people. The next 
section reflects briefly on shifts in national urban policy and its impact in Durban. 
 
Urban Reconstruction: Egalitarianism to Neoliberalism 
 
The present South African city form had been inherited from the legacy of   apartheid 
urban planning and was characterised by racially fragmented and discontinuous land 
uses and settlement patterns, haphazard, dysfunctional and inefficient spatial ordering, 
land use mismatches, low level population density and the concentration of the poor in 
relatively high density areas on the peripheries and the rich in the core intermediate 
urban areas (Hindson et al, 1992:6).  Against the background of the past, the 
reconstruction of a non-racial society would depend on the “the social, political and 
psychological incorporation of all black South Africans into legitimate state structures 
and the sensitisation of the state to survival systems and social networks that dominate 
the lives of the poor citizens” (Parnell and Pieterse, 1998:4). 
 
The first wave post-apartheid urban planning and development strategies were driven 
by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was adopted in 
1994. The RDP had a strong basic needs and social justice orientation.  The Urban 
Development Strategy (UDS) of the Government of National Unity, released in October 
1995, was influenced by the RDP in terms of being "people driven, integrated and 
sustainable, and implemented mainly through the reallocation of existing resources" 
(Government Gazette, No. 16679, 1995:15).  The UDS aimed to integrate segregated 
cities by concentrating on rebuilding the townships, creating employment opportunities, 
providing housing and urban amenities, reducing commuting distances, and introducing 
urban management policies which are environmentally sensitive (Government Gazette, 
No. 16679, 1995:10).   
 
The intention was to ensure that the resources of the built environment were used 
efficiently in targeting the needs of the urban poor so that they would become 
                     
23 eThekwini Economic Review, 2006/2007, p.26. 
24 eThekwini Demographic Projections, Report for eThekwini Transport Authority, August 2004, p. 26. 
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economically productive and contribute to the growth of the city as a whole. The aim 
was to build habitable and safe environments. In regard to human and social 
development and three areas were identified: 
a) Social Development - this would be achieved through community based 
development and the provision of health, educational, sport and recreational 
services and opportunities; 
b) Social Security - would take the form of caring for the aged, children who had been 
neglected, broken families, provision of social care and services; 
c) Safety and Security - would be achieved by addressing those socio-economic 
conditions which perpetuate crime and violence and undermine development 
(Government Gazette, No. 16679, 1995:11). 
 
Notwithstanding these laudable goals, and demands from community and labour 
organisations to realise them, the government argued that the pressures of global 
economic restructuring forced a shift in the macro-economic framework with the 
adoption of the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) structural 
adjustment strategy in June 1996.  GEAR emphasises that economic development will 
be led by the private sector; there will be privatisation of state owned enterprises; 
government expenditure (especially social services) will be reduced; exchange control 
regulations will be relaxed; and there will be a more flexible labour market (Department 
of Finance, 1996).   
 
The transition to neoliberal GEAR orthodoxy encountered an aberration with the basic 
needs oriented RDP (Bond, 2000).   GEAR's neo-liberal orientation was criticised as it 
would only address the needs of big business and foreign investors, and the gap 
between the rich and poor would widen.  This dependence on “market-led solutions is a 
high risk strategy, since there exists no example internationally where neoliberal 
adjustment … has produced a socially progressive outcome, especially in a country like 
South Africa, which is marked by extreme disparity and poverty” (Cheru, 2001:505).  In 
fact, the virtual abandonment of the RDP means that the poor will "occupy the lowest 
rung on South Africa's new non-racial urban hierarchy" (Saff, 1996:251). The neo-
liberal orientation of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy runs 
the risk of a production of class cleavages and the reproduction of socio-spatial 
inequalities distinctive of the apartheid era.  
   
At the urban level this means that local democracy is compromised as the fiscal 
prospects of local governments are dependent on business decisions of the private 
sector.  There will be a consequent limitation of democratic governance as “local policy 
inevitably bends away from many publicly favoured policies and towards meeting the 
needs of mobile capital, as well as those of existing businesses” (Williamson, 
Imbroscio, and Alperovitz, 2003:5).  As Elkin (1994:115) has emphasised, it was 
unlikely that such an alliance between the public and private sectors will “pursue 
egalitarian policies of any significant sort and will more than likely work to reinforce 
material differences among the population” 
 
In 1998 the White Paper on Local Government introduced the notion of ‘developmental 
local government’ (DLG) which was committed to “working with citizens and groups 
within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and 
material needs and improve the quality of their lives” (Republic of South Africa, 
 44 
1998:17).  From a planning perspective central government control over local 
development strategies has been reduced, with localities assuming greater control over 
such initiatives.  One of the reasons for this was the central state's inability to contribute 
towards the social support and welfare services which were imperative to address the 
gross inequalities of apartheid, and it transferred more of this obligation onto local 
government and the private sector. 
 
DLG exhorts local authorities to focus on achieving developmental outcomes, such as 
the provision of basic infrastructure and services; the creation of integrated cities and 
liveable environments; the encouragement of local economic development initiatives; 
and the empowerment of communities.  Developmental local government has four 
basic characteristics:  
i) executing municipal powers and functions in a way which optimises the potential 
for social development and economic growth;  
ii) development should be managed in a manner which ensures that it is integrated 
(socially and spatially, as well co-ordinating public and private investments), 
and sustainable; 
iii) promote democratic values institutionally and within the community; and  
iv) empower that poor and marginalised and build social capital by providing 
community leadership and vision (Government Gazette, 13/3/98). 
 
Privatisation of Public Transport 
 
The transport landscape in South Africa was largely shaped by colonial and 
apartheid social and spatial engineering to serve primarily the economic wants and 
social well-being of the minority white ruling class. It was a system designed to 
prevent the mixing of the different race groups by physically confining communities 
to isolated geographic areas so that the economic interests of a predominantly white 
capitalist class were served. The majority of disenfranchised Black communities 
were denied an opportunity to social well-being through a repressive system of 
control on their movement from centres of economic production. In the new 
democracy these past practices make pressing demands on the state to transform 
the transport sector in keeping with national, provincial and local development 
priorities. In the transport sector the political, economic and social dynamics is of 
complex dimensions involving a wide range of stakeholders with competing and 
opposing interest. This diversity in interest has plagued the public transport sector in 
the form of violent conflict, breakdown in regulation, inefficient use of resources and 
a source of threat to social and environmental development in the new democracy 
 
The Durban public transport system was subjected to significant changes in keeping 
with national policy, which aimed to reposition, transform and restructure public 
transport in South African cities and rural areas to meet changing commuter needs. 
Enormous responsibility was placed on metropolitan governments to plan, regulate 
and manage public transport since the adoption of the local government White Paper 
(1998). In addition, local authority resources were strained resulting from the re-
demarcation of boundaries of South African cities. Previously marginalised black 
townships and peri-urban areas were integrated within a super municipal structure in 
order to ensure that services are within economies of scale.   In the case of Durban, 
the boundaries of the core city were expanded to include 68% of the peri-urban 
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areas.  This demarcation further constrained the capacity of the DTMB to provide 
services to the newly incorporated areas of the city, as these were not subsidised by 
the previous government.  Lack of funding, competition with the mini-bus taxis, 
increased private motor ownership, rising fuel prices and increased demand from 
pupils for scholar travel at reduced fare rates placed the DTMB under enormous 
financial stress. 
 
The financial sustainability of the public bus company had become precarious; 
warranting an urgent search for alternative remedies considering the cities 
inheritance of other service backlogs.  Finding an appropriate financial solution was 
indeed a complex one for the metropolitan government especially in light of its 
invidious role of being a public service provider and taking on a new role of being a 
regulator as required by the National Land Transport Transition Act (2002). In terms 
of the NLTTA the management and regulation of public transport was to be 
devolved/decentralised to the most competent local level. The basic rationale for 
decentralisation was based on the assumption that local governments were in the 
most strategic position to plan, manage and regulate public transport.  It was against 
this context that the city had to break away from the dilemma of being both a “referee 
and a player” (service provider and regulator) to that of a regulating authority. 
 
In 1999 the National Department of Transport, the then Durban Metropolitan Council 
(now eThekwini Municipality) and the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport took a 
bold initiative to investigate both the establishment of a Transport Authority (TA) 
within the eThekwini Municipality and at the same time restructure its public 
operation to a privately owned one. These processes had to unfold parallel to each 
other i.e. the restructuring of the public transport company and the establishment of 
the TA had to complement each other (eThekwini Transport Authority Project Report 
2000:1). 
 
However, the decision to privatise Durban Transport met with political opposition. 
The main contention centred on the issue of subsidies. It was the shortfall in the 
subsidy, which the Durban ratepayers had to fork out raised political opposition from 
the Democratic Party, Cosatu (KZN) and the South African Communist Party (KZN). 
“Calls for halt on bus deal”, claims that the privatisation process was “daylight 
robbery of the taxpayer” were made (Daily News, 14/5/2003). Despite this political 
outcry, the council dismissed these claims stating that they had some “teething 
problems” over route designs that led to delays in the new owner taking full control of 
Durban Transport. However, further investigation with the provincial department and 
the metropolitan Traffic and Transport Department confirmed that there was a major 
problem with the route design. A private consultant was engaged to redesign the 
routes and this was expected to be ready by September 2004. Until that date there 
had been no sight of any route designs for the city. 
 
Despite the unresolved problem of subsidies and routes, the privatisation agenda 
went on track. The absence of clear route designs elicited major concerns on the 
ability of the metropolitan government to regulate competition for routes from 
operators providing different modes of transport on an unsubsidised basis.  In a 
dramatic turn of events competition for routes in the city after the privatisation of the 
public bus company, resulted in forced closure of certain taxi ranks due to violent 
 46 
reaction from competing taxi associations (Mercury, 20/05/2003). The new privatised 
operator wasted little time in offering its service on the disputed routes (The 
Independent on Saturday, 11/10/2003).  
 
Negotiations with labour on the privatisation agenda was characterised by ongoing 
conflicts and tradeoffs. Labour comprised the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU) a majority union with a membership of 900.  The Independent 
Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) were made up of predominantly whites, 
with a membership of 300. The two unions were in conflict over several labour issues 
over a period of time before the privatisation agenda was implemented. Claims of 
racism, nepotism and infighting within DTMB made scandalous news by SAMWU 
members. Ongoing badgering between union and management officials resulted in 
the CEO in the city administration Dr Mike Sutcliffe claiming that a number of 
accidents occurred monthly averaging between 18 to 32 and serious accidents had 
risen from 5 to 19 a month due to lack of driver competency. DTMB bosses also 
alleged reckless driving, speeding and rude behaviour on the part of SAMWU drivers 
(Mercury, 15 November 2002).   
 
Hurried attempts were made to investigate these claims and an independent 
investigative team was set up to unravel the problem besieging the public bus 
company. In response, senior officials of DTMB brought an urgent interim court order 
stopping investigations into allegations of internal racism, nepotism and corruption as 
claimed by the eThekwini municipal council. However, the investigation resulted in its 
leadership being suspended pending disciplinary enquiry and an interim 
management committee was appointed (Mercury, 15 November 2002). 
Subsequently, the investigation deviated from the original terms of reference into the 
labour scandal and expanded itself into an inquiry regarding privatisation policies, 
unfair dismissal, demotions, and medical boarding. This was the first time that the 
mask on privatisation by the municipality was removed (The Mercury, 15 November 
2002). To quote the General Secretary of the SAMWU (KZN) “call it privatisation, call 
it outsourcing, call it private-public partnerships, call it what you want” the council 
was playing hide and seek with the union whilst it intended to privatise DTMB 
(Sunday Tribune, 11 August 2002).  The SACP and Cosatu strongly opposed the 
municipality’s intention to privatise the public bus company. Questions were raised 
about the financial rationale behind the sale. It was contended that it made poor 
business sense to sell the transport operation for R70 million while the government 
had to subsidise the consortium by R186 million. Further it was argued that if the city 
had run the public transport company at a loss, how would it be possible for a private 
company to run the same operation at a profit? Interestingly, none of the community 
based organisations in and around Durban opposed the privatisation of DTMB. 
 
The landmark agreement reached with labour cleared the way for the municipality to 
pursue the final stage of the privatisation process by selling the public bus company.  
On 16 May 2002 the council resolved at its Executive Committee to dispose its bus 
fleet to a private operator through a public tender process. On the 9 February 2003 
council announced its intention to sell the public bus company. It called for an 
expression of interests from interested parties wishing to purchase the bus company.   
 
Intrigue and speculation surrounded the award of the contract to Remant Alton 
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consortium. Alton Coach Africa cc, a member of the Remant Alton Consortium was 
investigated by the Scorpions for irregular subsidy claims and failing to fulfil its 
“social investment commitments” (BEE) (Sunday Tribune, 1 June 2003). Claims of 
political connections influencing the bus deal were also made. A former United 
Democratic Front vice president in KwaZulu-Natal and the minister of transport in the 
province are known to have been close stalwarts in the liberation struggle which 
influenced the awarding of the tender. A political connection to the mayor of Durban 
as well was made.  It was alleged that the CEO of Remant Alton also had strong 
links to the ANC leadership due to his previous involvement in the UDF liberation 
days sponsoring his bus fleet to ferry protesters to and from political rallies. A press 
report confirmed that the CEO had a criminal record and was fined R6000 for bribing 
a Durban municipal official in 1997 (Sunday Tribune, 25 May 2003). The tender 
fiasco aroused much attention on the credibility of the tendering process resulting in 
the Scorpions25 undertaking a detailed investigation. To date the findings of this elite 
investigative unit is still a mystery.  
 
Despite claims (founded or unfounded) that a compatriotic relationship influenced the 
award of the contract to the private bus operator, taxi and other bus operators in the 
CBD welcomed the move. Various stakeholders in the public transport sector 
pledged that violence will be avoided at all cost and that they will strive to honour 
“governments dream to have taxis and buses work together” (Sunday Tribune, 18 
May 2003). This pledge never lived to its promise as violence between rival taxi 
associations in the city escalated as a result of competition for routes. The 
responsibility for these escalating levels of violence was placed on the doorstep of 
the Provincial government as it delayed the processing of permits to legitimise taxi 
operators. Consequently, illegal operators took the opportunity to capitalise on this 
situation.   
 
Interestingly, illegal taxi operators were not the only ones to capitalise on 
government’s failure. The newly inaugurated private bus consortium made hurried 
attempts at capitalising on this opportunity by offering to come to the rescue of 
stranded passengers since it shared a common route with taxi operators. The 
company argued that, “if there was extra commuter demand, then it was this 
company’s duty to run more buses” on the troublesome routes (The Independent on 
Saturday, 5 October 2002). This was the first sign of aggressive competition for 




However, in the absence of a TA26 to regulate the transport sector, the municipality 
had to depend on the elite Public Transport Enforcement Unit called “Operation 
Shanela” (means to clean-up – to rid the industry of all its ills) as an interim measure. 
The presence of this regulating unit was felt in the province and the municipality alike 
characterised by zero tolerance to traffic violations within the industry.  Strong 
reaction was received from taxi bosses who threatened that they “would really hit the 
                     
25 This is an independent national policing unit that investigates criminal cases such as corruption. 
26 The TA came into existence only on the 29th January 2004 when it was formalised by a founding 
agreement signed by the Minister of Transport. It must be noted that the DTMB was privatised before 
the establishment of the TA. 
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provincial government hard, unless it softened its hard line approach towards 
unroadworthy taxis and drivers without permits…” (Daily News, 26 January 2002).  
Since the setting up of Operation Shanela corruption in the public transport sector 
was exposed. The Minister of Transport (KZN) alluded to the fact that the ownership 
of taxis by the police personnel was the key cause of violence within the taxi 
industry. This compromised the objectivity with which the industry was regulated. 
Another actor in the industry emerged in the form of private security personnel 
comprising mainly former policemen who escort private buses on routes besieged 
with violence, hijacking and theft from passengers.     
 
Gauging from the way in which the privatisation process has unfolded several 
challenges are worth noting in respect of its future efficiency, viability, cost 
effectiveness and sustainability of the private bus consortium.  In terms of the 
contract the private transport company owns 60% of the shares, Taxi Co comprising 
five taxi associations in the city calling themselves Idlangamabala own 10%, and the 
remaining 30% is held by former DTMB staff known as Staff Co. The route 
distribution (as operated by the DTMB) is as follows: Remant Alton 60%, Staff Co 
20%, and Taxi Co 20%. 
 
Taxi Co operate on the former Mynah routes servicing the CBD, while Staff Co and 
Remant Alton on the remaining routes including the densely populated townships.  
Taxi Co appears to be the weaker partner in this consortium. Although they run the 
busiest routes in the CBD, in the final subsidy calculations they enjoy lesser 
kilometre benefits, compared to long distance transportation offered by Remant 
Alton. Staff Co have routes predominantly in white middle class suburbs with a 
heavy dependence on privately owned transport. Consequently, cracks in the 
relationship between consortium partners began manifesting itself soon after its 
formation. SAMWU shop stewards in Staff Co claim that they were allocated routes 
in the elite residential suburbs of La Lucia, Umhlanga and Durban North, whilst the 
holding company (Remant Alton) reserved routes for itself in the densely populated 
working class townships. They bitterly complained of the financial viability of these 
routes since middle class households seldom commute by public transport (Sunday 
Tribune, 18 May 2003).  
 
The issue of routes continues to be a contentious one for all transport service 
providers in the city, even though the TA is now in place.  At the time of privatisation, 
the bus routes were kept a guarded secret both by the municipality and the owners 
of the new consortium. Routes and passenger ridership have chronically been a 
source of violent conflict amongst taxi operators. In addition, routes serve as a basis 
upon which state subsidies are determined for approved bus operators. At a political 
level, this was contested by the SACP who maintained that a private company would 
not be in a position to financially sustain itself on route subsidies when the 
municipality had failed do so in the first instance.  Cleverly, private sector ingenuity 
won the day by not cutting costs by tampering with the routes instead responding to 
the financial dilemma by slashing the bus timetable.   In total, the consortium made 
1048 cuts in the bus timetable on routes with 50% and less ridership, which is 
claimed to make huge financial savings for the company. 
 
 49 
On the downside, the cut in the bus timetable as a cost saving measure prompted 
adverse reaction from competing groups for routes. In the elite Westville suburb, 
competing taxi operators wasted little time on cashing in on the vacuum left behind 
by the private bus consortium. This competition was violently contested resulting in 
taxi ranks being closed by the metropolitan authorities until the problem was 
resolved. The Warwick Avenue bus terminal, the largest passenger terminal in the 
city, had to be shut down due to violent clashes between taxi operators who defied 
rank rules regulating the frequency of trips on specified routes to cash in on the 
changed bus time table. 
 
The privatisation deal dealt a major blow resulting in the municipality cancelling the 
contract with Remant Alton and taking the role of the operator once again.  The TA 
to date has failed to regulate the public transport sector in the city, with taxi operators 
violating routes with increased competition amongst the consortium resulting in 
ongoing violence.  The TA has failed its regulatory function due to poor funding 
within the municipal and provincial governments budget resulting in the metropolitan 
transport system at the mercy of a “mafia” type of governance were Black taxi 
bosses regulate the sector through violent means. 
 
Privatistion and Social Exclusion 
Within an urban setting the implementation of GEAR "means privatisation and the 
promotion of the principle of cost recovery which will reflect in inadequate subsidies 
targeted at the poor" (Parnell and Pieterse, 1998:13). Regardless of how strong the 
case for privatisation may be, the capacity of private enterprise to provide services will 
be constrained by the capability of most people to pay (Gilbert, 1992).  The urban poor 
have suffered most from the restructuring and adjustment strategies and bear the brunt 
of reduced subsidies, increased cost of food and services, reduced wages, increasing 
unemployment, and reduced social expenditure (Amis, 1995). 
 
It is imperative that strong state intervention is both desirable and necessary in order to 
address the socio-spatial inequalities of the apartheid era.  However, the state's 
response has been to increasingly support the privatisation of basic services in keeping 
with the dictates of the neo-liberal agenda. In cities “the primary effect of reducing local 
government to a contractor of services and making fiscal principles of cost recovery the 
key measures of good governance are political: citizens are reduced to customers, and 
democratic principles of accountability (including participation) are replaced with market 
signals” (Heller, 2003:169). 
 
However, "privatisation and the promotion of the principle of cost recovery will reflect in 
inadequate subsidies targeted at the poor" (Parnell and Pieterse, 1999:75).  An implicit 
assumption in the privatisation debate is that the "market is more efficient than 
government at providing basic services" (Bakker and Hemson, 2000:6).  However, 
there are limits to what poor communities can achieve without active government 
intervention (Stock, 1995).   
 
Private companies are more profitable than those in the public sector because of their 
higher cost recovery rates.  However, this is often done at the expense of the poorest 
households not receiving any services.  The multi-national companies have a dismal 
record in terms of services to the poor.  The emphasis on cost recovery means a 
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lifeline service to the poor. However, the provision of such a low level of service 
geographically locks-in the spatial inequalities apparent under apartheid (Bakker and 
Hemson, 2000). 
 
The privatisation of services has far-reaching geographical implications.  Under 
apartheid the access to services had a distinct spatiality.  Townships were inadequately 
serviced, if at all, while the racially privileged enjoyed access to services comparable to 
those in the first world (Turok, 1994a, b).  The provision of services under apartheid 
was also symbolic of the exclusionary nature of the system: black people were seen as   
'outsiders' in the urban system a denial of their humanity and their citizenship.  The 
privatisation of basic services militates against the aim to build an inclusive society.  
The provision of a minimum level of service to disadvantaged areas re-emphasises 
apartheid boundaries in the geography of service distribution (Bakker and Hemson, 
2000).   
 
In Durban commodification of water resulted in the metropolitan government 
disconnecting some 3000 families per month at an annual cost of R9m flowing into 
the financial reserves of private contractors for the 2002-2003 financial year. 
Nonetheless, private sector ingenuity won the day through the introduction of pre-
paid meters (water and electricity), were consumers disconnect themselves.  Loftus 
(2004:195) revealed that 800 to 1000 “disconnections” were taking place across the 
municipality daily, amounting to roughly 4-5,000 per week, affecting as many as 
25,000 people. Some of these households have their flow restored, but the problem 
of under-consumption of water due to water restrictors is clearly widespread in 
Durban. A key contention is that ¨the policy of cost recovery and the commodification 
of basic municipal services … has pitted local bureaucrats and politicians against 
communities¨ (McDonald, and Pape, 2002:42). 
The following quotations capture some of the anger and anguish of residents (Loftus, 
2004:194): 
They can’t put me in jail…can’t put me in jail. They told me to pay 70 
something. They will think we’ve been playing with the water. My pension is 
R600 and the bill is R400. How can I pay this? 
I’m the only person who deals with it and I’m a pensioner. Yes, we were 
disconnected once for a long time and borrowed water from neighbours. I 
have been to the Metro in KwaMashu to discuss bills. We’re just washing 
ourselves and flushing the toilet. Before it wasn’t really an issue how much 
you used. Now I’m trying to think of the 1,000s. I don’t know what I’ll do about 
the high bills. 
Private companies are more profitable than those in the public sector because of their 
higher cost recovery rates.  However, this is often done at the expense of the poorest 
households not receiving any services: 
 Improved cost recovery in a privatised service may penalise the poorest 
households.  It may also not result in improved services but in higher 
profits for the owners.  Private companies will always be reluctant to 
extend their services to poorer areas especially if this requires a large 
investment (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989:160).   
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Under the financial recovery system, the prospect of poor people benefiting from a 
cost effective service was bleak. Subsidies from the general coffers of the state or for 
that matter from richer utility districts to poor ones are often unlikely. It is more likely 
that people living in an underdeveloped area would pay significantly more for 
services than those in wealthy developed neighborhoods. It costs more to bring 
services to an undeveloped area. Given the vast level of social and economic 
disparities and the racially fragmented spaces inherited from South Africa’s past, it is 
the poorer areas that will be worst afflicted by this neoliberal system of cost recovery.  
 
As market penetration increases, the state retreats, the social welfare net is reduced, 
and the urban poor are increasingly marginalised.  Women are increasingly vulnerable 
and subjected to social exclusion, and this will be illustrated in the first case study. 
 
 
Case Study I: Vulnerabilities of Women 
 
 Women hawkers at the Durban station take turns sleeping at the end of 
the rows in which they bed down for the night so that the same woman is 
not raped every time (Daily News,14:12:93). 
 
In spite of the post-apartheid government's commitment to gender equality, women 
continue to be marginalised and many only survive in the informal economy (Maharaj 
and Mabona, 1996). 
 
A large percentage of informal street traders in cities like Johannesburg and Durban 
are rural migrants who are victims of poverty, and hence lack many basic necessities 
especially, housing. The legacy of influx control legislation and gender discriminatory 
housing policies, together with the shortage of affordable accommodation nearer the 
city centres, made it impossible for women in the informal economy to secure safe 
living environments (Lund, 1998).  The political legacy of apartheid and the patriarchal 
nature of South African society makes women, especially those engaged in the 
informal sector, particularly vulnerable to abuse (Vogelman and Eagle, 1991; Simpson, 
1992). 
 
A study in Durban revealed that rural poverty and impoverishment, and the perceived 
better economic opportunities in urban areas has led to women migrating to the city so 
that they could meet their family responsibilities. Most women traders in the study were 
engaged in the informal sector as a survival strategy.  The income of traders was 
crucial for the survival of the rural household as there was a high dependency of 
children, older folk and other economically inactive members of the extended family.  
An important point to emerge from this study was that the women were prepared to 
endure the hardships of squatting or even living in open places because of their 
dependence on informal trading. The lack of access to accommodation and a better 
source of income meant that the women’s survival was only achieved with considerable 
difficulty (Pillay and Maharaj, 1998). 
 
The Durban study revealed that migrant women were not only subject to systematic 
forms of oppression but were especially vulnerable because of their social status.  A 
shortage of affordable accommodation and high travelling expenses were the main 
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problems women experienced in securing suitable and safe living arrangements.  
Although for most women accommodation was a high priority in ensuring their safety 
and security, they chose to save whatever little they earned for their children rather 
than spend it on lodgings.  Housing authorities should therefore consider the conditions 
of women living on the street and the special constraints placed on them because 
many were supporting families, had little or no formal employment skills, and earned 
low incomes (Pillay and Maharaj, 1998).    
 
Women traders were very aware of their feelings of fear, powerlessness and 
vulnerability. Hence, they developed a number of individual and collective strategies to 
cope with the threats and dangers they faced. They appeared to have some 
understanding of the political and economic dynamics influencing their situation. 
Although some women felt that the municipality should provide accommodation and 
protective trading areas, many of the women did not have much faith that it would 
intervene in their favour. The weakness in the criminal justice system and the general 
disintegration of law and order should also be seen as a factor that contributed to 
women’s vulnerability and was likely to increase their chances of becoming victims 
again.  
 
Women in the informal sector, because of their class, gender and racial identities, have 
become prime targets for violent abuse. Many theorists hold that violence against 
women is a consequence of the power relations inherent in a patriarchal society, and 
that class and ethnic differences also overlay this gender related experience 
(Vogelman and Eagle 1991; Simpson, 1992).  Although urban development strategies 
contain "considerable opportunities to influence the direction and prioritization of 
development in more gender aware ways, gender concerns tended to be subsumed 
and ultimately neglected" by the Durban Metro Council (Todes, 1995:328-329). The 
vulnerability of women and the violence they experience is seen as a private and 
individual matter and not seen within the broader socio-economic and political context.  
 
The right of women to work safely in public places and the role of government policy in 
protecting that right should become a part of research agendas and policy discourse. 
Whilst much attention is being devoted to businesses and specific groups like farmers 
as victims of crime, felonies against women traders were unlikely to attract the same 
attention or resources as they do not have much economic clout or power (Posel and 
Isaacs, 1993). 
 
Another example of urban social exclusion is the treatment of undocumented 
migrants, and this is the focus of the second case study 
 
 
Case Study II: Kwerekwere – Violence and Xenophobia  
 
Undocumented immigration has become a potentially explosive issue in South 
African cities.  The reasons for this are steeped in a variety of social, political and 
economic situations not only in countries of origin but in destination areas as well. 
The patterns, nature and socio-cultural and economic implications are extremely 
complicated and no simple answers or solutions can be forwarded.   
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Xenophobia is rife in the townships, where the migrants are referred to as 
kwerekwere (disparaging word for African immigrant).  It has been argued that 
xenophobia "thrives where economic deprivation and hardships are acute" (Sunday 
Times, 28/8/94).  There was also the view that the migrants were seen as tempting 
'scapegoats' for the 'country's ills': 
With a black government in power and apartheid gone, many black 
South Africans have realised that they can no longer blame the system.  
Most are turning on the most visible scapegoat - immigrants.  The new 
government would do well on its promise of a better life for all before 
discontented South Africans turn on foreigners and blame them for the 
country's ills (Sunday Times, 28/8/94). 
 
The city of Durban is trying to market itself towards the high-end of the tourism 
market with a special emphasis on attracting mega sporting events. The Soccer 
World Cup, played during June and July 2010, was viewed by the city authorities as 
a catalyst for turning Durban into ‘Africa’s premier sporting and tourism destination’ 
(Bass 2009: 250). In order to realize this aim, the post democratic government is 
committed to fundamentally changing the core of the city that stretches from the 
central business district to the beaches, into servicing a sport and tourist precinct 
(Maharaj, Pillay and Sucheran, 2006).  
 
A key contention is that the attempt to create a city with a large sports precinct at its 
centre is predicated on creating exclusive areas where the local poor are pushed out 
and given decreasing levels of access to resources. Reading Bass, one gets the 
impression that those who hold institutional power are simply making the City anew, 
that this process is uncontested and that everybody benefits from these changes. 
Yet, in a confined strip of thirty by thirty city blocks there are intense contestations 
about who is an insider and who is not, who gets to stay and who disappears into the 
night.  
 
This section analyses two case studies of this “pushing” and “shoving”. The first took 
place in the Albert Park area, where tensions built through December 2008 and 
culminated in a deadly attack against African immigrants in January 2009.  Albert 
Park has historically comprised of high-density flats which until the mid-1980s was 
zoned for white occupation as per the Group Areas Act (1950). Since then the area 
has gone through a process of desegregation, and residents include white 
pensioners, upwardly mobile blacks, students, and more recently a point of entry for 
immigrants from Africa (Maharaj and Mpungose, 1994). The second is an ongoing 
battle between traders and the City authorities at the Warwick Junction who desire to 
destroy the existing market, and build a shopping mall in its place.  
 
In the Albert Park area, there were two mobilizations against immigrants during 
December 2008 and January 2009. In one attack, local South Africans in late 
December entered an apartment block Jamba House, known to house “foreigner”, in 
St. George’s Street. They proceeded to throw all the foreigners out. Jamba House 
had been the scene of a number of police raids through 2008. In one raid in late 
2008 the residents allege that police simply confiscated all their possessions. The 
organization Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) had taken up a number of cases after 
residents produced receipts for the goods (Desai, 2010).  
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Eugene Madondo, a Zimbabwean, was aware of the situation but thought that it was 
simply the excesses of the festive season and that things would settle down in the 
new year. But he felt uneasy. Each evening, as dusk fell, he took refuge in his room 
at the boarding house, Venture Africa. Until the inevitable happened. 
Then came this attack on 4th January 2009. It was on a Sunday at half past 10 
pm. I saw a group of people carrying the weapons like bush-knives and 
knobkerries. They were carrying hammers, too. They were blowing the 
vuvuzela. They were chanting the slogans in Zulu languages, and some of 
them were singing. I saw them coming in the direction of the flat where I stay, 
Venture Africa.27  
 
To get to Venture Africa the crowd had to march past the police station. CCTV 
footage caught the marchers on the streets. People ‘heard the mob, saw the mob’ 
repeated a woman at the offices of the Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), a Refugee 
and Migrant Rights Project that has its office in Diakonia Avenue, which is very close 
to Venture Africa, when she recounted events leading up to the attack.  The LHR 
was established in 1996 and its Refugee and Migrant Rights Project is a specialist 
program that seeks to ‘advocate, strengthen and enforce the rights of asylum 
seekers, refugees and other marginalised categories of migrants in South Africa.28 
The owner of Venture Africa was contacted and phoned the police to intervene. They 
told him it was the legitimate work of the Community Policing Forum (CPF). 
Madondo described how the mob forced its way up to the sixth floor. He locked his 
room and was ‘so scared’ when he heard ‘the noise of the people screaming’ and the 
‘doors being broken with the hammers.’ He opened his door to escape but saw his 
neighbour being thrown from the sixth floor to the street. Before he could lock the 
door of his room, the mob, with the men in front and women following, entered his 
room yelling, “Shaya! Shaya!” When they discovered that he was from Zimbabwe, 
they shouted, “Shaya kwerekwere! Shaya!” (Desai, 2010). 
Madondo was hit on the head with a knobkerrie. As ‘the blood started to flow, I felt 
weak and screamed for help.’ He fell and heard one of the attackers say in Zulu, 
‘Let’s throw this dog outside the window.’ Five men lifted him and tried to push him 
though the window. He tried to grab hold of the window frame, all the while yelling for 
help, but they broke the window frames and pushed him down from the fifth floor. 
Fortunately for Madondo, he fell on top of the two men who had been thrown out of 
the window before him and lay dead on the street (Desai, 2010). The mob noticed 
that Madondo was not dead, and threw empty beer bottles and other object at him. 
Madondo continues: 
I didn’t even notice these guys were dead. I told them, “Come on guys. There’s 
a storeroom nearby that we can crawl to” …. I lost my conscious. Next time 
when I came to, it was to see what was going on the next day at 11am in 
Addington Hospital… I stayed at Addington hospital for five weeks. During that 
time, detectives and investigators were coming there to take the statement from 
                     
27 Interview: Eugene Madondo, Durban, June 2009. 
28 See Lawyers for Human Rights, ‘Refugee and Migrant Rights Project,’ 
http://www.lhr.org.za/programme/refugee-and-migrant-rights-project. Accessed various times between 
October 2009 and April 2010. 
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me. Then, I was transferred to Clairwood Hospital, where I was being treated 
by the spinal doctor. And, the inspector told me that they managed to arrest 
some eight of the perpetrators. In the hospital I was shocked to read from the 
newspaper that I was dead – me, and other two guys.29 
The two dead friends that Madondo landed on were Omar Said from Somalia and 
Victor Zowa. Victor’s brother Raymond had been displaced by the May 2008 attacks 
in Alexandra. He had gone back to Zimbabwe, to his hometown of Chipenge (where 
specifically – just over the border), but facing starvation, he returned to South Africa. 
He made a quick exit out of Johannesburg and sought refuge in Durban. He brought 
his little baby, his wife and brother Victor with him. His wife saw Victor being pushed 
out of the window. Victor’s death brought enormous guilt. Raymond, in a state of 
deep depression, tried to commit suicide. Saved by some friends he and what was 
left of his family went back to Zimbabwe (Desai, 2010).  
Others were pushed too. A group of forty-seven refugees from the DRC that sought 
shelter at Albert Park in the aftermath of the May 2008 attacks was constantly 
harassed by police. They begged the City to turn the place into an official camp. 
Local NGOs—some of them in the pay of the United Nations Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNCR).30—tried to convince the group to disperse. Every day they faced 
harassment from police. A particularly insidious language was developing from the 
City authorities. For City manager Mike Sutcliffe, the issue was simple: “The families 
have a choice of either going back to their countries or to places in the community 
they were living in before the July problems. The municipality cannot suddenly 
prioritise their housing needs when we already have 200 000 [local] people with 
housing needs in the city itself” (Sowetan, 6/11/2008).   
The refugees, in fact, had not demanded formal housing; all they wanted was to 
have a sanctuary in Albert Park. It was an insinuation that could only isolate the 
refugees further and act as a cover for the City’s inability to make good on its 
promises of housing the poor. Sutcliffe’s rationale for a speedy removal had another 
basis also: “I have instructed the metro police to remove people from the park 
because the surrounding community has complained about crime” (Mercury, 
3/11/2008). The fact that none of the refugees was linked to any crime did not seem 
to matter.  
The City duly arrived in early November 2008 in the form of Durban Solid Waste and 
a strong contingent of metro police. Tents were pulled down and documents thrown 
into garbage bags. This time the rationale was that the park needed to be cleaned 
up. One of the 47, Aziza Wilondja, a mother of six who had hung onto the park for 
four months spoke of how their clothes and identity documents were “confiscated”: 
“The police took our things and put them in the garbage vehicle. They brought down 
our tents and threatened to beat us” (Mercury, 3 November 2008).  Once joined in a 
                     
29 Interview: Eugene Madondo, Durban, June 2009 
 
30 The Office of the UNHCR was established in 1950 by the UN General Assembly. It is mandated to 
co-ordinate international efforts to ‘safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees.’ It has offices in 
South Africa and works to provide technical advice, training and support to the Department of Home 
Affairs to increase its asylum processing capacity, provide direct assistance to the most vulnerable, 
and assist those who wish to resettle voluntarily (see http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485aa6.html). 
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bid to hang onto bare rudiments of life, this assault forced the 47 to leave Albert Park 
and embark on separate, individual journeys. 
Vusi Khoza, one of the alleged central instigators of the January attack, is also on 
the prowl in the Albert Park area. He remains ANC ward councilor and chairs the 
Metro Police Civilian Oversight Committee. He claims credit for the Metro Police 
moving its headquarters to what was once the whites-only Albert Park bowling club.  
Meanwhile Madondo made his way back to the supposed scene of death. His room 
had been ransacked and many of his fellow tenants had vanished in fear of another 
attack. Madondo sought help from the LHR and the Refugee Social Services (RSS).. 
Madondo was asked to participate in the police identification process. He went to the 
police station but, like other victims of xenophobic attacks, was scared because most 
of their attackers were out on bail and they ‘fear that they will be killed by the 
perpetrators of the attacks’ (Desai, 2010).  
The Investigation Parade took place on 19 May. He identified some of the 
perpetrators, including Vusi Khoza, whom Madondo described as  
so evil. He is lacking a sense of living together. Before the attack he used to 
come to Venture Africa pointing the fingers on the foreigners who live in the 
flats… He is trying by all means to destroy the evidence by killing the state 
witnesses (Desai, 2010:427).  
When Madondo pointed Vusi out, the police asked him to step forward: 
When he did that even though he could not see me, he shook his finger to let 
me know to feel threatened. I don’t hate him. All, I don’t like is how he treats 
other people, especially the foreigners. All I need is for him to be trialed for 
what he did and he must get a sentence. He thinks he is above the law’ 
(Desai, 2010:427). 
The trial was set for 4 June. Madondo intended attending the trial because he saw it 
as a  
lesson to our South African brothers that the attack on the foreigners is not all 
that good, because we are here to make a living and to support our families at 
home. The situation at home is causing us to leave our home countries. So, if 
you take refuge in another country and you find out that the situation in that 
country is even worse than back home, and local people are out to kill you, 
then where actually do we go? (Desai, 2010:427). 
Word was out that Madondo was in Port Shepstone. In fact, after the attack he 
carried on living in the Albert Park area. It was an act of defiance. Madondo, in part, 
survived by telling what Asad (2003: 28) has called “socially useful lies’ and hanging 
onto the services of different organizations. This got him into trouble as he was 
accused ‘of taking money from various organisations, but I was just not having 
enough money from each one. So, I took whatever I got for that month. It turned into 
a big story. Then, they all didn’t want to help me anymore. I had to make ends meet, 
by whatever means” (Desai, 2010:427).. Madondo survives in part by sacrificing his 
family life. His wife, Fungai, and young son, Ashley, have long gone back to 
Zimbabwe. As the date for the court case approached, Madondo went into protective 
custody. He is forced to rely on the protection of the very police who have harassed 
him through his stay in the city.   
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Pressure will increase on African immigrants in the area. On 26 June 2009 the 
eThekwini Municipality sent out a notice advertising an African Unity Six, a Side 
Soccer tournament to be held under the banner ‘Fighting Xenophobia and promoting 
African Unity through Soccer’. The letter was sent out in the name of Vusi Khoza, the 
very person fingered for leading the attacks on immigrants in the Albert Park area.  
In the small space of the inner city tensions accumulate, concentrate and erupt. The 
Community Policing Forum (CPF) has equated crime with the presence of African 
immigrants. Using this institutional base, they have raided flats were immigrants live 
on the basis of daily board and have thrown them out. Once on the streets the police 
move in to harass and force the immigrants to keep on the move until finally they 
leave the area altogether. The police too, according to the LHR, have taken to 
raiding flats and simply confiscating the goods of immigrants, regardless of whether 
they have receipts of purchase or not (Desai, 2010).  
The situation in the Albert Park area is particularly acute because the CPF and the 
ward councilor have a close relationship and their power reaches into City Hall. 
Classically, in the Albert Park area one group of ‘local’ poor were positioned as 
policing agents against poor African immigrants.  
  
The organizations supporting the immigrants at Diakonia Centre have their hands 
full. Both the LHR and the RSS are contracted by the UNCHR. On any given day the 
queues are long and resources short. Their work is about papers, legalities and 
treating each case in an individual way. They are not in the business of collectives 
and mass mobilizations. These organizations, for example, were opposed to the 
concentration of immigrants at Albert Park (interview LHR). They could not fathom 
the strategy of the immigrants, whose stubborn presence exposed the lack of 
support from the City authorities. Their tents staked out a place in the heart of the 
inner city and their continuing resistance in the face of their tents being pulled down 
and harassment by the police drew attention to the ongoing xenophobia in the City. 
Their bin packets used for shelter further exposed the lack of state support. These 
various acts of defiance highlighted their plight, which have been hidden had they 
followed the advice of the NGOs (Desai, 2010). 
For the City manager, it was a ’problem’ that had to be made to disappear, warning 
that while the support of NGOs and the public was to be commended ‘we also have 
to take care that we do not perpetuate the situation longer than necessary. A 
growing refugee problem is something we must try and avoid at all costs’.31 
For the UNCHR-supported NGOs this was just a ‘tactic’ that the immigrants played 
because they wanted to demand a camp in order to eventually facilitate their 
rendition to a “first world country”. In their view, the rudimentary shelter was not an 
act of desperation and fortitude but a place of opportunism and conspiracy.  
If, on the one hand, refugee support has become technical and individualized, the 
recognition of refugees in the city, on the other hand, has become more professional. 
Amisi and Matate (2009), for example, point to the fact that in its early years the 
commemoration of World Refugee day in Durban was organised by the refugee 
community themselves. However, in the last two World Refugee Days the 
                     
31 (http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/government/media/cmn/cmnitem.2008-07-25.8057331980/view, accessed 
27 June 2009) 
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community was replaced in this work by service providers supported by the 
government. This changed the complexion of the commemoration ‘into one for the 
poor and the refugees often without food or drink, and usually in a tent; and another 
one for the agencies in comfortable venues such as City Hall, with expensive food 
and drinks.’ As Amisi and Matate (2009) laconically reflect, the service providers 
developed a commemoration ‘to celebrate themselves’. 
 
The killings in January 2009 were the acme of high intensity xenophobia in Albert 
Park. To some extent the potential court case has reduced tensions. The case has 
made headlines and those who are keen to attack foreigners realise that there could 
be a price to pay if there are overt attacks. But there is a low intensity threat 
everyday on the streets.  
The City is supporting plans to revamp blocks of flats into sectional title units that will 
sell from between R250 000 and R400 000. African immigrants without access to 
papers and credit will not be able to take advantage of these developments. The 
relocation of the Metro Police Headquarters will make Albert Park increasingly 
inaccessible to immigrants and refugees. This poses a problem as it is one of the 
last of the commons where African immigrants are able to meet and receive a meal 
or other assistance from individual “do-gooders” or faith organizations.   
 
The Warwick Market Saga 
In the inner city of Durban locals push out foreigners. Yet there is an outer ring 
around the city of both new and old social forces that is pushing out the locals. 
“World class developments for a world class city” is the motto of the City Manager. 
On the south side of Durban, uShaka Marine World has displaced the Ark, a refuge 
for old people and subsistence fishermen. North of the city are the multi-billion rand 
casino and soccer stadium complexes that have privatized beaches and other public 
spaces and plan to monopolize the trade in the modern opiates of the people: sports, 
films and gambling. The sea blocks any attacks from the east but on the western 
outer ring the Warwick Avenue market, which has been the home of African and 
Indian small fresh produce traders, bovine head cleaners and a host of other 
informal sellers is under siege (for a history of the area, see Maharaj 1999).   
 
The Warwick Avenue Triangle (WAT), an inner city community, and one of the oldest 
mixed residential areas in Durban, defied the apartheid state's strategies to destroy 
it.  It would appear that in the post-apartheid era, the Durban Metro is attempting to 
succeed where apartheid failed. The public outcry against the Durban Metro’s plans 
to replace the historic market with a mall, displace poor traders from the Warwick 
Avenue area and deny them their livelihoods reveal significant continuities between 
the apartheid and democratic eras (Maharaj, 1999; 2010). 
 
Caroline Skinner, a researcher at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, presented a neat 
anatomy of the market. It has 673 trading sites, with over fifty market gardeners 
selling their produce there daily. They are thus an important part of the city-wide 
fresh produce distribution chain because they supply other informal trades. Around 8 
000 street and market traders operate out of the Warwick market. Many peripheral 
vocations are connected to this, such as barrow operators and suppliers of tables, 
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paraffin and shopping bags. When it was decided to release this land, the Council 
did not call for expressions of interest or have a public tendering process. Further, 
none of the traders presently operating from the market were included in the share 
ownership of the BEE consortium driving the development (Mercury, 27 May 2009). 
Participation in the process to discuss the future of the traders was clearly predicated 
on an acceptance that the traders would have to move and the market, a historic 
heritage site, would be destroyed (Mercury, 2 June 2009). City manager Mike Sutcliffe 
has been quick to use a number of arguments to justify the decision to push out 
traders. For one, why would anyone want to go to such an area, Sutcliffe (2009) 
asks: 
 
For most of the day the area is dirty, there are far too few ablutions and 
commuters are very vulnerable, with this being the most dangerous set of 
intersections in South Africa. There are no banks, post offices and sufficient 
public services in the area to serve the number of people who deserve 
access.  
 
Sutcliffe failed to acknowledge that it was under his watch that this state of affairs 
has been allowed to prevail and get progressively worse. Rather, he implies that it is 
the fault of the traders in the area.  While he bemoans the lack of finance to develop 
this critical part of the city, money does not appear to have been an issue for the 
development of what one writer to the local newspaper called “white elephants” 
scattered through the city - an over budget stadium, uShaka, and the Point 
Development (Mercury, 02 June 2009). 
 
uShaka, one of Sutcliffe’s major monuments, continues to demand copious amounts 
of money from the City. Just as the City’s sub-committee was trying to sell off 
uShaka to private interests, the embarrassing extent of its costs were revealed. It 
was reported in the Natal Mercury in June 2009 that the ANC caucus was discussing 
the possible privatisation of uShaka which had been built at a cost of R750 million in 
2004. Visvin Reddy, ANC exco member and chairman of the council's infrastructure 
committee, said that members were concerned about the burden on ratepayers and 
the impact on service delivery. The municipality's equity in the theme park stood at 
half a billion rands (Mercury, 02 June 2009). Sutcliffe’s riposte was that he was 
“disturbed” at the negative portrayal of the park by the media which was ‘one of the 
best-known tourism facilities in South Africa’ (Mercury, 10 June 2009). Sutcliffe failed 
to add that from its inception uShaka was too expensive for the average South 
African, given that entrance fees alone cost R360 a day for an average family of four 
in 2004 (Maharaj, Pillay and Sucheran, 2006: 277). By 2010 this fee had surpassed 
the R400 mark.  
 
Sutcliffe’s other key argument is that the Junction in Warwick Avenue is a major 
commuter hub and that the City needs the space to service its needs. Having 
attempted to isolate the Indian traders as the barrier to progress and purveyors of 
nefarious practices, Sutcliffe had still another race card to play: Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). He pointed out that the municipality did not receive enough 
funding from national government to build a taxi facility on the site of the Early 
Morning Market. The developers tasked to regenerate the Berea Road Station came 
up with a proposal that, in Sutcliffe’s (2009) view, “was a win-win solution, not 
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costing the municipality any more than what is on budget”. Best of all, the 
development had a ‘strong empowerment content’.  
 
A quarter of the developers were of African origin and Sutcliffe proudly boasted that 
he had set as a condition that within five years this should increase to over half. He 
regarded it as ‘unacceptable that even 15 years after a democratic government is 
established that people formerly classified as African South Africans are not in the 
mainstream of retail developments and this Warwick development will help to 
redress that’ (Sutcliffe, 2009). This point is also emphasized by Phillip Sithole, head 
of the city's Business Support and Markets Unit, who said: “Here's a local investor 
with a black economic empowerment element saying other people should make 
money and why not? Because we have to protect the market”? (Mercury,1 June 
2009).  
 
It’s becoming a familiar script in South Africa. The poor “others” not in line for 
empowerment opportunities are dispossessed as the black elite get empowered.’ As 
Michael MacDonald so acutely points out, BEE functions not only  
 
to legitimate South Africa’s political economy, but it also provides business, the 
ANC, and leading tendencies within the ANC with ancillary benefits. For ANC, 
BEE first and foremost acquits race of responsibility for ongoing economic 
inequality. Since some Africans are becoming rich, economic inequality is 
deemed not to be a racial problem, an immense advantage to the established 
bourgeoisie (MacDonald, 2004:646).   
 
So one sees at Warwick the African poor being asked to sublimate “their particular 
interests as poor people to the general interests of the African people, as it is coming 
to be embodied in the African bourgeoisie” (MacDonald, 2004: 648). 
 
One of the ironies of Sutcliffe’s attempts to stigmatise Indian traders is that the city 
authorities’ actions in clamping down at the Warwick market on “illegal” traders is 
that African traders have mainly suffered. On the other hand, Indian and African 
traders have built a fighting unity and non-racial solidarity. This has only heightened 
attempts by the city to break this unity by counterpoising legal against illegal, African 
against Indian. 
 
If the African foreigners are the outsiders of the inner city, at the market, there is 
another language for the outsider, the poor. They are to make way for what the new 
ruling class sees as an important symbol of post-apartheid South Africa: the 
shopping mall.  
The shopping mall is a ubiquitous symbol of South Africa’s economic development 
and rampant materialism. At the citadel of wealth and excess, Sandton Shopping 
Mall, Mandela stands tall; President Zuma opened the Pan African Mall in Alexandra, 
so darkly and ironically named after the xenophobic attacks in Alexandra, just across 
the highway.  Zuma followed in Mandela’s wake and visited the Maponya Mall which, 
he said, told “a new story. Here you can walk into world-class shops and buy what 
you want. You don’t have to go to town, or Northgate, Southgate, Eastgate or 
Westgate. This is a story of our freedom” (Mail & Guardian, May 29 to June 4 2009). 
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While the traders at Warwick have sustained a powerful resistance, the combined 
forces of old white capital, new Black Empowerment types, and City Hall will 
probably prevail as public funds are used to subsidise private profits. Somewhat 
belatedly, but importantly, the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), 
the largest union federation in the country, which was formed in the 1980s and now 
constitutes one part of the ruling tripartite alliance with the ANC and South African 
Communist Party, entered the fray. The provincial secretary of COSATU, Zet Luzipo, 
articulated their support for those being pushed out by this kind of development. 
Luzipo said that the development was  
 
quite clearly not the interests of poor workers but for the benefit of a few 
people. We have been arguing against the privatisation of the resources of 
state property. We are not going to fold our arms and expect manna from 
heaven, we are going to fight for this place. The poor must fight for what 
belongs to them. This is an act of an economic parasite where you suck the 
blood of those who have got nothing to give to the bank balances of the rich 
(Daily News, 01 June 2009). 
 
Yet between the alliances and fissures there are many social forces involved in the 
struggle over space at Warwick Junction. Sutcliffe is deployed by the ANC. He acts 
with the mandate of the ANC. COSATU is in alliance with the ANC. They will huff 
and puff but in a year from now they will be mobilising to help the ANC retain control 
of City Hall. The Warwick Triangle as we know it will disappear, but the Alliance 
Triangle with the ANC at the apex will endure with COSATU posturing only to 
deceive.  
 
Newton derived a law of science to the effect that every action generates an equal 
and opposite reaction. This law is both universal and inescapable. Social science is 
a little different. Its laws can be bent. The trick in politics is to have any inconvenient 
reactions to your actions displaced onto others to bear. The sociological literature on 
scapegoating makes this very point (Bonacich, 1973; Harris, 2004). The City fathers 
of Durban have a historic talent in this regard.   
For example, in 1949, in the early days of the white minority National Party 
government, Indian traders were set upon by Africans who had been pushed out of 
the city by the segregationist policies of the apartheid government. A reading of the 
local press in the late 1940s (such as Natal Mercury and Daily News), shows Indians 
depicted as ‘selfish’, ‘sly’ and ‘alien’, and Africans as exploited yet also brutal. There 
were reports both of a police force reluctant to intervene as the riots spread and 
direct instigation by city authorities (Desai and Vahed, 2010) Whatever the causes, 
the effect of the 1949 riots called for a firmer hand from government and a radical 
change in the city’s geography to better regulate trade, the inflow of a ‘better sort’ of 
native and, in the discourse of the day, the development of a “European City”.    
Who would know better how a bit of crime and grime can serve as a pretext for 
strong-arm capitalist development than a former Marxist geographer, Mike Sutcliffe, 
in the service of the interlocking worlds of high finance and elite nationalist politics?  
While the languages of citizenship, crime-fighting, development and slum-clearance 
can take quite a sinister turn in the hands of ANC Councillor for Albert Park (Ward 
32), Vusi Khosa, there is a more interesting topic to research.  How does a person 
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like City Manager Mike Sutcliffe benefit from someone like Vusi Khosa, or for that 
matter, how do all of us “citizens” benefit from the stigmatisation and attack on 
“illegal aliens”? In other words, how does developmentalism, crime-prevention and 
so on serve to displace and deflect the predictable reaction to the inequalities in our 
society onto others? 
As terrible and individually evil as it was, xenophobia in Durban was the push of a 
class increasingly excluded from the city by a tightening ring of development. From 
the point of view of developing a world-class city, it served a function. While 
xenophobic violence may look horrible on television for a while, in designing the city 
anew, what could be better than having the poor turn on each other. It allows the 
ruling classes to articulate the message that ‘our priority is our own people who are 
patiently waiting on a long housing list’ (Desai, 2010:433). Instead of the exorbitant 
costs of elite developments being at the root of many of the city’s problems, 
suddenly the problem for the poor are foreigners who are trying to muscle in on 
housing and jobs.  
The life of the African immigrant and refugee becomes a life that is constantly on the 
move. If they stop to seek refuge, they often times become “quarantined” in small 
enclaves where “big men” come to hold sway. At other times they become the 
source of social “experiments”. One group of the displaced in Durban were taken to 
a farm a 100 kms out of the city. In a place called Cransbrook, a church group 
sought to turn them into a self-sustaining community cut off from the rest of society. 
Nobody asked if they had farming skills. The scheme collapsed.32 
And on the edge of the city old languages get dressed up for new times. Ethnic 
dominance and hygiene fall under the general label of “development” (for an 
excellent history of how the City authorities used hygiene and sanitation to justify 
segregation, see Swanson, 1983).  Hearing the term development to justify 
dispossession and eviction one is here reminded of Serge Latouche’s reflection of 
‘poisonous words which infiltrate like a drug, perverting desire and blurring 
judgement. Development is one of those toxic words...Development has been and 
still is an uprooting (Latouche, 1993:160).  
 
In both parts of the city, Albert Park and Warwick Junction, the agency of ordinary 
people comes up against the designs of City authorities to push them out. Eugene 
Madondo fights a lonely individual battle through the courts. His struggle though has 
inspired other African immigrants to cling onto to the city centre. The traders come 
up against a powerful array of forces that is able both to use the language of race to 
divide and brute force to intimidate and cower. Thousands of street vendors are 
overnight declared illegal simply because the City arbitrarily limits the number of 
licenses. They fight back through mass struggle and the courts.  All too often the 
struggles are separate. But still connections are made. The wheel barrow operators 
in July 2009 linked up with bus-drivers in a major march onto City Hall. At the same 
time, they were able to win an interdict to continue operating at the market after the 
authorities tried to prevent them from entering. 
 
At a court appearance on 18th August 2009 the case against four of the accused for 
the murder of Victor Kowa and Omar Said and the attempted murder of Madondo 
                     
32 Interview LHR June 2009 
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were withdrawn.  
 
Four others would stand trial. Among the four is Vusi Khoza, who attended court 
wearing the colours of the national soccer team, Bafana Bafana. At the back of the 
shirt was printed, accused number 6, Not Guilty. Nelson Mandela famously wore the 
number 6 jersey when he joined the South African rugby team on their winning of the 
1995 Rugby World Cup signalling both an acceptance of the Springbok emblem and 
that it was no more the preserve of the white minority.  It is difficult to discern what 
message Khoza was sending, except to say that he was standing in court as an 
elected representative of the same organisation as Mandela, the African National 
Congress.  
 
Bass (2009:253-4) quotes a local provincial politician reflecting on the power of 
Durban as an African city because of the  
 
Cosmopolitan appearance of the population, the multitudes of cultures (and) 
tolerance of diverse cultures…availability of a diverse kind of goods, 
particularly when we talk about the arts and crafts, that are very specific in 
terms of identity-that these are what you will find in an African setting. And it’s 
increasingly getting very cosmopolitan in terms of African states, that you will 
find actually showing their influence around. So it makes you very much…able 
to say once you are here, you are in a friendly environment…But linked to that 
of course is a question of efficiency…you must find it a safe place.  
 
Bass quotes the politician without any sense of irony or critical reflection. What is 
happening is that African migrants are being pushed out of the city. The numbers of 
street traders and market gardeners are to be dramatically cut down and the rest 
bundled into a shopping mall. To develop a world class sporting precinct is to have 
no poor people resident close by. This is to provide the sense of security and a “first 
world environment”. Efficiency means to provide a transport network in which the 
poor can come into the city everyday to labour in the precinct and return to the 
outskirts, like in the apartheid era.  
 
If one stands on the commanding heights of the Berea Ridge and look down towards 
the Indian Ocean, one can see the dramatic re-shaping of the city of Durban. The 
Suncoast Casino edges out onto the sea. To access that part of the coastline you 
must pay. UShaka leans into the harbour of South Beach. Millions of rands of public 
money were pumped into this development and it continues to demand more. Once 
again to access its wonders, one must pay hundreds of rands.  Then there is the 
spectacular Moses Mabhida stadium and the International Convention Centre.  
There is no need to comment on the price of admission there. Soon the new Mall will 





It would appear that in Durban local government is grappling between the political 
vision it has set its self as contained in the IDP to alleviate poverty and at the same 
time to attract investments and promote economic growth in the city. More 
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concretely, their dilemma is to find a way out to act both for a wider socio spatial 
equity and create the necessary condition that will best sustain the city’s economy. 
Of recent, attempts at maintaining a balance between these two visions has resulted 
in a tough compromise in favour of business interest at the expense of those 
considered poor and marginalised in the CBD.    
 
One case study can best describe this difficult political choice confronting the 
municipality. To enable one of the most important developments in South Africa (The 
Point Development) in the Point area, close to Durban’s CBD, the eviction of the Ark 
Church Ministries, which offered shelter to the homeless, and disadvantaged in the 
city at the beginning of 2004 evoked wide political debate.  
 
As poverty alleviation is one key area of the local government’s responsibility, the 
municipality argued that all residents would be re-accommodated. Of the 700 to 900 
residents, about 100 handicapped, ill and frail residents were accommodated at the 
Cato Manor Clinic, while another 300 were relocated to the Welbedacht housing 
development, some 20 km from the CBD which is 45 minutes to an hour’s drive by 
public transports. Many residents refused to move from the Point area which was a 
very convenient location and the fight between the Ark shelters on the one hand and 
the eThekwini Municipality and the Point Development Company was taken to the 
high court on May 2004 to stay the relocation. In a final bid, the eviction was 
confirmed in favour of the eThekwini Municipality who “posted a strong security 
presence at the entrance and around the perimeter of the building to enforce the 
court order” (Gangaram, 2004).  
 
In Welbedacht, “they have been allocated their own homes. While the relocated 
residents expressed concern about how they were going to travel from the area in 
search of employment, they were very thankful to have their own homes” 
(Gangaram, 2004). Since then, both the handicapped relocated to Cato Manor and 
those in Welbedacht encountered many problems as the surrounding communities 
refused to accept them with reports of physical attacks being perpetrated: “a group of 
Cato Manor residents, some armed with hammers, sticks and pipes, forced 107 Ark 
residents to flee their new, albeit temporary, shelter in Bellair Road, Cato Manor” 
(Bisetty, 2004a). In response to this physical violence the local government had to 
enforce a very tight security for the displaced even to the extent of erecting fences 
around the shelters to protect them from any future attacks.   
 
A reflection on the events leading to relocation of inhabitants living in the Ark Ministry 
suggests that there had been no consultation and dialogue with local communities 
who complained about the nuisance that these newcomers to their residential area 
will create. On the other hand, the former Ark residents are now living in a hostile 
environment, far from job opportunities and have to bear high transport costs to and 
from their newly found abode. However, the story does not end as simplistically as 
the local government did not find a solution for all of them, resulting in the 
engagement of a costly special consultant to find a way forward to this complex 
problem of forced resettlement.  In a twist of faith for the Ark dwellers, the solution 
found had been to provide them a bus to go to Cape Town. Two busloads of new 
entrants arrived in the Mother City in June 2004 with a number of them having ended 
up on the streets of Cape Town, swelling the city's homeless population (Bisetty, 
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2004b). This case highlights the political choices that the democratic local 
government had to make between a go-ahead economic policy and its social 
solicitude.  
 
Durban South Displacement? 
A common theme in South African apartheid urban history is the destruction of 
established black communities and forced relocation from areas like Sophiatown, 
Cato Manor, and District Six. Clairwood in the south of Durban also makes this 
legendary list, where about 6000 (of the initial 55 000) residents have defied 
attempts by the local state in the colonial, apartheid and democratic eras to uproot 
and relocate an established, thriving community, which was built by indentured 
labourers and their descendants, in favour of industrial development. 
 
In the post-apartheid era, there were suggestions that Clairwood was being 
industrialised by stealth through a process of deliberate decline and dereliction. 
About 73 percent of residential sites were being illegally used for commercial and 
industrial purposes in defiance of zoning regulations.  
 
With the sale of the old airport to Transnet, Back of Port and Dug-out Port plans, and 
the sale of the Clairwood Race Course to Capital Property Fund, the residents of 
Merebank, Wentworth and Clairwood once again face the very real threat of eviction 
and displacement at worse, or living under more hazardous environmental 
conditions. There should be no illusions about this, notwithstanding protestations to 
the contrary by the major role players: Durban Metro, provincial government, and 
Transnet.  
 
While the municipality has initiated a public consultation process, affected 
communities should not be fooled – the project is a done deal. The state’s argument 
is that the various Durban South projects are in the public interest because new 
investment opportunities which would create jobs. 
 
It is important to note that the threat to the homes and livelihoods of south Durban 
residents is not new and has been on the agenda of the Durban City Council for the 
past 50 years. In October 1964, the City Engineer, C.G. Hands contended that in 
order to promote “industrial expansion in the City … it can be expected that the 
following net acreages of land will become available in the future: Clairwood Flats 
310 acres … (p. 40), … Merebank-Wentworth Housing Scheme area (when houses 
have been amortised) 740 acres (p.41)” (Hands, 1964).  
 
It would appear that since 1994 Durban South Residents have been subjected to 
neo-apartheid policies. Residents in Merebank and Wentworth have experienced 
major pollution and environmental disasters which have made international 
headlines, and the local, provincial and central governments have yet to intervene to 
bring the culprits to book.  
 
About 285 000 people live in the South Durban Region and there are a number of 
highly active social organisations involved in the protection of the communities’ 
wellbeing in the area. These organisations include the South Durban Environmental 
Alliance, the Umbilo Action Group, the Clairwood Ratepayers Association, among 
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others. These groups have been well-involved in attempts to combat the 
development of the dugout port and the back of port logistics precinct, which impacts 
directly on them and their fellow residents. However, these attempts have largely 
been in vain given the problematic public participation process for this development. 
Draft plans have been produced without any public participation, as well as serious 
social and environmental impact assessments. Public meetings, although often well 
attended, have left communities even more mystified with the presentation of 300 
page, highly technical documents (for many in their second language) and no real 





This paper has illustrated that there are remarkable continuities between the 
apartheid and post-apartheid eras, especially in terms of top-down dictatorial 
decision-making and lack of participation, and the use of force and the potential for 
violence in Durban.   
 
The development crisis in the Durban region was illustrated by the rapid population 
growth, a slow economic growth rate, housing backlogs, an increasing number of 
informal settlements, increasing poverty, high unemployment rates, an inadequate 
supply of basic services to the majority of the population, and land claims from the 
proliferation of informal settlements in Durban demands that the pace of land reform 
and housing delivery processes increase significantly. There were also problems 
relating to illegal immigrants and xenophobia. As a result of their illegal status 
migrants in Durban were subject to crime, violence, high levels of exploitation and 
they led a tenuous existence.   
 
In Durban the International Convention Centre, Point Redevelopment Project and the 
Moses Mabhida stadium were part of the Metro’s strategic planning initiative to form an 
alliance between local government and the private sector to help save the region's 
ailing economy. These projects were underpinned by a protocol to address past 
inequalities, with policies for affirmative action, stable job creation and levelling of 
playing fields. However, all these predictions of thousands of employment opportunities 
did not consider the cyclical nature, low paying and unstable jobs that were created by 
the tourism-convention centre industry. New jobs were not created but were merely 
redistributed to white suburbanites and not the low income groups.   
 
Those with resources (largely the largesse of apartheid) attempted to insulate 
themselves from the larger socio-spatial fabric, and demonstrated a reluctance to 
share and redistribute resources.  Affluent metro authorities like that in Durban were 
reluctant to incorporate the rural poor into their boundaries because of the cost of 
subsidising services and infrastructure in these zones.  Similarly, there was concern 
that incorporation of rural areas will result in increased municipal service charges 
being imposed on these communities (Giraut and Maharaj, 2003).   
 
There were concerns about falling property values and decline in standards in terms of 
maintenance and services in the CBD.  This became apparent since the late 1980s 
when blacks began to move into predominantly white inner city areas like Albert Park.  
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However, to attribute this decline to the presence of blacks was unfair and racist.  It 
was the 'slumlords' who were largely responsible for the lowering of standards because 
of their reluctance to invest in the maintenance and upkeep of premises largely 
occupied by blacks.   
 
As the demand for cheap accommodation in the city escalated, rents also increased.  
In order to meet rising rentals poorer tenants began to ‘sub-let’ their flats, contributing 
to overcrowding and increasing pressure on services. There were also unscrupulous 
landlords who charged excessively high rentals and maximised their incomes by 
overcrowding their flats, but did not pay levies for service charges, leading to a decline 
in services and maintenance.   
 
Changing economic and social conditions resulted in an escalation in survival activities 
like prostitution and informal trading. Basically, "capital disinvestment has created a 
space for those excluded from formal economic activity to gain a foothold in the urban 
system" (Bremner, 2000a:11). These ventures were accompanied by many 
management problems, including a deluge of people to the city, as well as increasing 
numbers of street children (a consequence of the impact of AIDS). 
 
In Durban major private sector enterprises were relocating from the CBD to the 
suburbs, especially north of the city.  Concerns about crime, grime, congestion, the 
escalation in street traders and the failure to effectively implement by-laws were key 
factors influencing the decision to decentralise.  These factors inevitably lead to a 
decline in property values and redlining by financial institutions which initiated a 
vicious downward spiral.   
 
The Albert Park and Warwick Triangle areas would be prime examples.  It would 
appear that such areas have been neglected by landlords, local authorities and 
financial institutions in terms of provision of services and amenities. Overcrowding 
and inadequate maintenance were catalysts for urban decline. A concerted effort is 
required from the private and public sectors to halt the physical decay in such areas 
and to facilitate general upgrading. 
 
Since the advent of democracy in Durban, there was concern about the lack of delivery 
and the great expectations of the people.  Within the city there were extreme 
conditions, with first world housing clusters (in former white group areas) adjacent to 
informal settlements. Existing levels of services were being maintained in the former 
white areas.  Cynics would argue that this would entrench the inequalities inherited 
from the apartheid era.  However, it should be noted that the new black elites have 
moved into these areas precisely because of the high standard of services.  The focus 
in black areas was on the provision of infrastructure.   
 
The impacts of the apartheid system of racial division and prejudice have continued 
to influence the manner in which different ethnic groups interact with the urban built 
environment and with each other in Durban and other South African cities. There is a 
steady process of residential desegregation and re-segregation, while integration is 




Although there was a high level of organisation and mobilisation in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, many civic organisations in Durban were weak because their leaders were 
now part of one of the government tiers.  There was a call for a more vigorous 
mobilisation at grassroots level   that will force the authorities to listen to the views of 
the electorate. However, twenty-two years after democracy, service delivery protests 
are escalating in the context of increasing poverty and corruption, and the failure of the 




This paper is part of the IDRC and DFID funded “People, Places and Infrastructure: 
Countering Urban Violence and Promoting Peace in Mumbai, Durban and Rio De 
Janeiro” project. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of 





Amis, P. 1995. Making sense of urban power. Environment and Urbanisation, 
7:145-58. 
 
Amisi, B. and Matate, P. 2009. Refugees are Real People with Real Needs. 
Mercury, 24 January. 
 
Asad, T. 2003. Formations of the Secular. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
Bakker, K. and Hemson, D. 2000. Privatising Water: BoTT and Hydropolitics in 
the new South Africa. South African Geographical Journal, 82:3-12. 
 
Bass, O. 2009. Aiming for Africa: Durban 2010 and notions of African urban 
identity in U. Pillay,  R. Tomlinson, and O. Bass, (eds.),  Development And 
Dreams: The Urban legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup. Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, pp. 246-265. 
 
Bennington, J. and Hartley, J. 1994.  From transition to transformation: The 
strategic management of change in the organisation and management of change 
in the organisation and culture of local government in the new South Africa.  
Warwick Business School. 
 
Bisetty, V. 2004a. Communities don’t want ark in their backyard. Daily News, 1 
June. 
 
Bisetty, V. 2004b. Ark floats on booze, irate residents claim. Daily News, 6 June. 
 
Bonacich, E. 1973. A theory of middleman minorities. American Sociological 
Review, 38: 583-594. 
 
Bond, P. 2000. Elite Transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa. 
London: Pluto Press. 
 
Bremner, L. 2000a. Re-inventing the Johannesburg Inner City. Paper presented 
at a Research Seminar, Department of Architecture, University of 
Witswatersrand. 
 
Bremner, L. 2000b. Post-apartheid geography: a case study of Greater 
Johannesburg’s Rapid Land Development Programme. Development Southern 
Africa, 17: 87-104. 
 
Casale, D. and Thurlow, J. 1999. Poverty, Inequality and Human Development in 
the Durban Metropolitan Area. Report prepared for the Economic Development 
Department, Durban Metropolitan Council,p.7. 
 
Cheru, F. 2001. Overcoming apartheid’s legacy: the ascendancy of neoliberalism 




Chetty, D.R. 1990.  The Durban Riots and popular memory.  Paper presented at 
the History Workshop, `Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid', 
University of Witwatersrand, 6 - 10 February, Johannesburg. 
 
City of Durban 1995. Settlement Areas and Population Estimate Project Durban 
Metropolitan Area.  Urban Strategy Department. 
 
Coleman, G. 1995. Strategies for economic growth and development in KwaZulu-
Natal.  South African Labour Bulletin, 19 (December):48-52. 
 
Crush, J. 2001.The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human 
Rights in South Africa. International Migration, 38:103-33. 
 
Cunnan, P. and Maharaj, B. 2000. Against the odds: Health care in an informal 
settlement in Durban. Development South Africa,17:667-686. 
 
Department of Finance 1996. Growth, Employment and Redistribution - A Macro-
Economic Strategy.  Government Printer: Pretoria. 
 
Desai, A. 2010. Between the push and the shove: Everyday struggles and the 
remaking of Durban. African Studies, 69: 423-437.  
 
Desai, A. and Vahed, G. 2010. Between Reason and Treason. Pietermaritzburg: 
Shuter and Shuter. 
 
Dhupelia, U. 1982. African Labour in Natal: Attempts at Coercion and Control 1893-
1903.  Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 5:36-48. 
 
Diamond, D R :  Managing Urban Change.  The case of the British inner city in  
Bennett, R. & Estell, R 1991. Global Change Challenge: Geography in the 1990s.  
London, Routledge. 
 
DIMES 1994.  Classes of Struggle: 60 years of DIMES 1934-94. Souvenir 
Brochure. 
 
Durban Housing Survey, 1952.  A study of housing in a multi-racial community.  
University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg. 
 
Edwards, I.A. 1983.  'Living on the smell of an oilrag': African life in Cato Manor 
Farm in the late 1940s.  Paper  presented to a workshop on  African life in Durban 
in the Twentieth Century, University of Natal. 
 
Edwards, I.A. 1989. Mkhubane Our Home: African Shantytown Society in Cato 





Edwards, I.A. 1994. Cato Manor: Cruel past, pivotal future.  Review of African 
Political Economy, 61:415-427. 
 
Elder, G. 1990. The grey dawn of South African racial residential integration. 
GeoJournal, 22:261-266. 
 
Elkin, S. 1994. Business-state relations in the commercial republic. Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 135:115-139. 
 
eThekwini Municipality, 2014. Integrated development plan – Annual Review 
2013-2014. Durban. 
 
eThekwini Municipality, 2016. Spatial Development Framework Review 2016-
2017. Durban. 
 
Fick, G. 1999. The gender-sensitive check-list for free and fair elections, Agenda, 
40: 66-74. 
 
Forrest, R; Lloyd, J; Rogers, N & Williams, P. 1979.  The Inner City: In Search of 
the Problem.  Geoforum, 10: 109-116.   
 
Gangaram, D. 2004. uShaka Prices Uproaor – Growing anger over outrageous 
entry fees. Daily News, 19 April, p. 2. 
 
Gigaba, M. and Maharaj, B. 1996. Land Invasions during Political Transition: The 
Wiggins Saga in Cato Manor.  Development Southern Africa, 13: 217-236. 
 
Gilbert, A. 1992. Third World Cities: Housing, infrastructure and servicing. Urban 
Studies 29: 461-482. 
 
Ginwala, F.N. 1974. Class, Consciousness and Control: Indian South Africans 
1860-1946.  Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University. 
 
Giraut, F. and Maharaj, B. 2003. Contested terrains:  Cities and hinterlands in 
post-apartheid boundary delimitations. GeoJournal, 57:39-51. 
 
Grant, L. and Kohler, K. 1996. Evaluating Tourism as a Policy Tool for Urban 
Reconstruction in South Africa: Focus on the Point Waterfront Development, 
Durban, Kwazulu-Natal, in: R.J. Davies (ed.), Contemporary City Structuring.  Cape 
Town: IGU Commission on Urban Life, pp. 531-541. 
 
Guillaume, P. 2002. Johannesburg: gÈographies de líExclusion. Paris: Karthala. 
 
Hands, C.G. 1964. Outline Plan for the City. City Engineer’s Report, Durban. 
Hardoy, J.E. and Satterwaite, D. 1989. Squatter Citizen - Life in the Urban Third 





Harper, G. 1995. A Councillor’s Vision. Agenda, 26: 25-29. 
Harris, B. 2004. Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa? In D.  
Hook and G. Eagle (eds.), Psychopathology and social prejudice. Juta: Cape 
Town, pp. 169-184. 
 
Heller, P. 2003. Reclaiming Democratic Spaces: Civics and Politics in 
Posttransition Johannesburg. In R. Tomlinson, R. Beauregard, L. Bremner and X.  
Mangcu (eds.) Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Postapartheid 
State. New York: Routledge, pp. 155–84. 
 
Hemson, D. 1979. Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: Dockworkers of 
Durban.  Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick. 
 
Hindson, D. et al 1992.  Restructuring the built environment.  Report to Working 
Group 5, National Housing Forum. 
 
Hindson, D. and McCarthy, J. 1994 (eds.) Here to Stay: Informal Settlements in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Indicator, University of Natal. 
 
Hindson, D. and Makhathini, M. 1993. Community dynamics and leadership in 
Cato Manor. Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Durban-
Westville. 
 
Hindson, D. and Byerley, M. 1993. Class, Race and Settlement in Cato Manor: 
Report on surveys of African and Indian Households in Cato Manor. Institute for 
Social and Economic Research, University of Durban-Westville. 
 
Hindson, D., Byerley, M. and Morris, M. 1994.  From Violence to Reconstruction:  
The making, disintegrating and remaking of an Apartheid city.  Antipode, 26: 323-
350. 
 
Hughes, H, 1987a. Violence in Inanda. Paper presented at the History 
Workshop, University of Witswatersrand. 
 
Hughes, H. 1987b.  Violence in Inanda, August 1985. Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 13:331-354. 
 
Khan, S. and Maharaj, B. 1998.  Restructuring the Apartheid City: CATO MANOR - 
`A Prime Urban Reconstruction Opportunity'?  Urban Forum, 9:197-223. 
 
Khan, S., Lootvoet, B., and Vermeulen, S. 2009. Privatisation of Durban Public 
Transport and Challenges for an Emerging Metropolitan Transport Authority. 





Kirk, S.L. 1983.  The 1949 Durban Riots - A Community in Conflict.  Unpublished 
Master's dissertation, University of Natal, Durban. 
 
Kuper, L. 1965.  An African Bourgeoisie. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Ladlau, L.K. 1975.  The Cato Manor Riots, 1959-60.  Unpublished Master's 
dissertation, University of Natal, Durban. 
 
Latouche, S. 1993. In the Wake of the Affuent Society: An Exploration of Post-
Development. London: Zed Books. 
 
Lemanski, C. 2007. Viewpoint Global Cities in the South: Deepening social and 
spatial polarization in Cape Town. Cities, 24: 448-461. 
 
Loftus, A. 2004. Free water as commodity: The paradoxes of Durban’s water 
service transformations. In D McDonald and G Ruiters (eds.), The Age of 
Commodity: Water Privatization in Southern Africa. London: Earthscan, pp. 189–
204. 
 
Lund, F. 1998. Women Street Traders in Urban South Africa: A Synthesis of 
Selected Findings. CSDS Research Report No. 15, University of Natal, Durban. 
 
Lupton, M. 1992.  Class Struggle over the built environment in Johannesburg's 
coloured areas.  In D.M. Smith (ed.), The Apartheid City and Beyond - Urbanisation 
and Social Change in South Africa.  Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University 
Press, pp. 65-73. 
 
Maasdorp, G. and Humphreys, A.S.B. 1975. From Shantytown to township. Juta, 
Cape Town. 
 
Maasdorp, G. G. and Pillay, N. 1978. The informal sector in Clermont. In G. G.  
Maasdorp (ed.), The informal sector: Concept and case study. Durban: University 
of Natal, pp. 26-75. 
 
Mabin, A. 1992.  Dispossession, Exploitation and Struggle: an historical overview 
of South African Urbanization in Smith, D.M. (ed.) The Apartheid City and 
Beyond. London: Routledge, pp. 13-24. 
 
MacDonald, D. 2004. The Political Economy of Identity Politics.  The South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 103:4. 629-57.  
 
Maharaj, B. 1992. The `Spatial Impress' of the Central and Local States: The 
Group Areas Act in Durban.  In D.M. Smith (eds), The Apartheid City and 






Maharaj, B. 1993. Post Group Areas: Residential Desegregation Trends in South 
African Cities.  In O. Ural et al (eds.), The Future of Human Settlements: 
Challenges and Opportunities.  Proceedings of the 21st IAHS World Housing 
Congress, Cape Town, pp. 293-304. 
 
Maharaj, B. 1994.  The Group Areas Act and community destruction in South 
Africa: The Struggle for Cato Manor in Durban.  Urban Forum, 5:1-25. 
 
Maharaj, B. 1996. Urban Struggles and the Transformation of the Apartheid Local 
State: The Case of Community and Civic Organisations in Durban.  Political 
Geography, 15: 61-74. 
 
Maharaj, B. 1997a. Apartheid, Urban Segregation and the Local State: Durban 
and the Group Areas Act in South Africa. Urban Geography, 18:135-154. 
 
Maharaj, B. 1997b. The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid 
Transformation in South Africa: The Case of Durban. Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, 15: 261-285. 
 
Maharaj, B. 1999. The Integrated Community Apartheid Could Not Destroy: the 
Warwick Avenue Triangle in Durban.  Journal of Southern African Studies, 
25:249-266. 
 
Maharaj, B. 2010. Post-apartheid urban contestations: the struggle for the 
Warwick Market in Durban.  Paper presented at the Association of American 
Geographers Annual Conference, Washington D.C., 14-18 April. 
 
Maharaj, B. and Mpungose, J. 1994.  The Erosion of Residential Segregation in 
South Africa: The `Greying' of Albert Park in Durban.  Geoforum, 25: 19-32. 
 
Maharaj, B. and Mabona, E. 1996. Women, Survival Strategies and Informal 
Settlements: Case Studies from Butterworth, Transkei. African Urban Quarterly, 11: 
28-33.  
 
Maharaj, B. and Ramballi, K. 1996. Recent Trends in Local Economic Development 
in the USA: Policy Implications for Urban Reconstruction and Development in 
South Africa. Urban Forum, 7:159-182. 
 
Maharaj, B. and Ramballi, K. 1998. Local Economic Development Strategies in an 
Emerging Democracy: The Case of Durban in South Africa. Urban Studies, 35:131-
148. 
 
Maharaj, B. and Khan, S. 1998. Urban Reconstruction, Development and Planning 
in the new South Africa: The case of Durban.  In H. Dandekar (ed), Space, 





Maharaj, B., Pillay, V. and Sucheran, R. 2006. Durban - A Tourism Mecca?  
Challenges of the post-apartheid era.  Urban Forum, 16: 262-281. 
 
MacDonald, D. 2004. The political economy of identity politics. South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 103: 629-57. 
 
Makhatini, M. 1991. The fate of the African landowner: A case study of Inanda. 
Unpublished Paper, University of Durban-Westville. 
 
Mare, G.and Hamilton, G. 1987. An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and 
the Politics of Loyal Resistance. Johannesburg: Ravan.  
 
McCarthy, J.J. 1985. Progressive Politics and Crises of Urban Reproduction in 
South Africa: The Cases of Rents and Transport. African Studies Seminar Paper, 
University of Witwatersrand. 
 
McDonald, D.A. and Pape, J. 2002. Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service 
Delivery in South Africa.HSRC/ZED: Cape Town and London. 
 
Mchunu V., 2002a: Rural areas strain city budget. Mercury, 13 June, p. 2. 
 
Mchunu V., 2002b: Police ‘unable to service new ares’. Mercury, 21May, p. 3. 
 
Meer, F. 1969.  Portrait of Indian South African Indians.  Durban, Avon House. 
 
Meer, F. 1985.  Indentured labour and group formations in apartheid society.  
Race and Class, 26:45-60. 
 
Meer, F. 1985. Unrest in Natal. Durban: Institute for Black Research.  
 
Mesthrie, U.S. 1989. Indian National Honour versus Trader Ideology: Three 
Unsuccessful Attempts at Passive Resistance in the Transvaal, 1932, 1939 and 
1941. South African Historical Journal, 21: 39-54. 
 
MIRA 1958.  Memorandum of objection against the proposal for the zoning of 
Mayville, Cato Manor, Manor Gardens, Manor Gardens, Candella and Stella Hill for 
future European occupation under the Group Areas Act, 1950, as amended 
submitted to the Durban City Council by the Mayville Indian Ratepayers' 
Association, 30 April 1958. 
 
Mkhwanazi, D.D.B. 1990. Contextual Development.  Paper presented at the 
Economic Development Conference, 7 November 1990. 
 
Morris, M. and Padayachee, V. 1988.  State Reform Policy in South Africa.  





Olufemi, O. 1998:  Street homelessness in Johannesburg inner-city: a 
preliminary survey.  Environment and Urbanization, 10(2): 223-234. 
 
Parnell, S. and Pieterse, E. 1998. Developmental Local Government and Post-
Apartheid Poverty Alleviation. Paper presented at the City of Durban Research 
Project Conference, 9-11 July, University of Natal. 
 
Parnell, S. and Pieterse, E. 1999. Developmental Local Government and Post-
Apartheid Poverty Alleviation. Africanus, 29:61-86. 
 
Parnell, E. Pieterse, M. Swilling, Wooldridge, D. (eds.), 2002. Democratising local 




Pillay, C. and Maharaj, B. 1998. The Vulnerability of women in the informal 
economy: A case study in the Durban Central Business District. Unpublished 
Paper, University of Durban-Westville.  
 
Pillay, U. 1996. Local economic development initiatives in South Africa: the case 
of Durban. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Minnesota. 
 
Pillay U. 1999. Demarcating South Africa’s metro areas: a cautionary lesson from 
the Durban Metropolitan Area. In R. Cameron (ed.), Democratisation of South 
African Local Government. J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, pp. 201-223. 
 
Popke, E. J. and Ballard, R. 2003. Dislocating modernity: Identity, space and 
representations of streets in Durban, South Africa.  Geoforum, 35: 99-110. 
 
Posel, D. and Isaacs, S. 1993. Editorial. Agenda, 18:2-3. 
 
Ramballi, K. 1997. Land Reparation and Restitution in Cato Manor. Unpublished 
Masters Thesis, University of Durban-Westville. 
 
Republic of South Africa, 1998. White Paper on Local Government. Pretoria.  
 
Reintges, C.M. 1990. Urban movements in South African black townships: a case 
study.  International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 14: 109-134. 
 
Rich, P.B. 1978.  Ministering to the White Man's needs: The development of 
Urban Segregation in South Africa. African Studies, 37:177-191. 
 
Rogerson, C.M. 1997. Local Economic Development and Post‐Apartheid 






Routledge, P. 1993.  Terrains of Resistance.  London: Praeger. 
 
SACN (2004) State of the Cities Report 2004. Johannesburg: SACN 
(www.sacities.net). 
 
Saff, G. 1996. Claiming a space in a changing South Africa: The "squatters" of 
Marconi Beam, Cape Town.  Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 
86: 235-255. 
Schensul, D. 2008. From Resources to Power: The State and Spatial Change in 
Post –Apartheid Durban, South Africa. Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 43: 290-313. 
 
Schensul, D. 2009. Remaking an apartheid city – state led socio-spatial 
transformation in post-apartheid Durban. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brown 
University. 
 
Seethal, C. 1991.  Restructuring the Local State in South Africa.  Political 
Geography Quarterly, 10: 8-25. 
 
Simpson, C. 1992. Jack-asses and Jackrollers: Rediscovering gender in 
understanding violence.  Occasional paper written for the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation. 
 
Sitas, A. 1986. Culture and production: The contradictions of working class 
theatre in South Africa. Africa Perspective, 1/2: 84-110. 
 
Stock, R. 1995. Africa South of the Sahara - A Geographical Interpretation. 
London: Guilford Press. 
 
Sutcliffe, M. 2009. Response to academics around Warwick Developments. City 
Manager’s Newsletter, 4 June. 
 
Stucky, C. 1999. Councillors remain invisible. Reconstruct, 8 August 1999, pp.1-
2. 
 
Swanson, M.W. 1968. Reflections on the Urban History of South Africa: Some 
Problems and Possibilities with special reference to Durban.  In H.L. Watts (ed), 
Focus on Cities. Durban: University of Natal, pp. 142-149. 
 
Swanson, M.W. 1976.  The Durban System: Roots of Urban Apartheid in Colonial 
Natal.  African Studies, 35:159-176. 
 
Swanson, M.W. 1983.  `The Asiatic Menace': Creating Segregation in Durban, 
1870-1900.  International Journal if African Historical Studies, 16: 401-421. 
 




South African Conference on Terrritorial Innovation, January, Grenoble, France. 
 
Tinker, H. 1973. The Politics of Racialism: South African Indians.  Journal of 
African History, 14, p. 525. 
 
Todes, A. 1995. Gender in metropolitan development strategies: The case of 
Durban. Cities, 12:327-36. 
 
Turok, I. 1994a.  Urban planning in the transition from apartheid Part 1: the 
legacy of social control.  Town Planning Review, 65: 243-259. 
 
Turok, I. 1994b. Urban planning in the transition from apartheid Part 2: Towards 
reconstruction.  Town Planning Review, 65:355-374. 
 
Turok, I. and Watson, V. 2001. Divergent Development in South African Cities: 
Strategic Challenges Facing Cape Town. Urban Forum, 12(2): 119-138. 
 
Van Donk, M. 1998. Women in Local Government in South Africa – From 
Marginalisation to Empowerment, Seminar Report, pp. 2-14. 
 
Vogelman, L. and Eagle, G. 1991. Overcoming Endemic Violence Against 
Women. Social Justice, 18:1-2. 
 
Watson, V. 2002. Change and continuity in spatial planning; metropolitan 
planning in Cape Town under political transition. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Webster, E. 1978.  The 1949 Durban Riots - A Case Study in Race and Class.  In 
P. Bonner (ed.), Working Papers in Southern African Studies. African Studies 
Institute, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
 
Williamson, R., Imbroscio, D., Alperovitz, G. 2003. Making a place for local 
community: Local democracy in a global era. New York: Routledge. 
 
Wolpe, H. 1972. Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from 
segregation to apartheid. Economy and Society, 1:425-456 











                     
 
